The Outer Fringes of Chapter 11:  Nonconsenting Senior Lenders\u27 Rights Under Subordination Agreements in Bankruptcy by Kravitz, David
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 91 Issue 2 
1992 
The Outer Fringes of Chapter 11: Nonconsenting Senior Lenders' 
Rights Under Subordination Agreements in Bankruptcy 
David Kravitz 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David Kravitz, The Outer Fringes of Chapter 11: Nonconsenting Senior Lenders' Rights Under 
Subordination Agreements in Bankruptcy, 91 MICH. L. REV. 281 (1992). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol91/iss2/5 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
NOTE 
The Outer Fringes of Chapter 11: Nonconsenting Senior 
Lenders' Rights Under Subordination Agreements in 
Bankruptcy 
David Kravitz 
lNTRODUCTIONl 
Subordinated debt has long been viewed as a vital component of 
corporate finance.2 During the 1980s, the use of subordinated debt in 
both leveraged buyouts and more mundane financing transactions in-
creased dramatically.3 As the entities those transactions created col-
lapse into bankruptcy, 4 the treatment of subordinated debt under the 
Bankruptcy Code5 will become increasingly important. 6 At the mo-
ment, however, "there is no settled black letter law regarding subordi-
nation agreements" and there is "a relative lack of reported 
bankruptcy cases which discuss subordination agreement issues in 
depth."7 
The treatment of subordination agreements between unsecured 
1. Readers of commercial law literature will recognize the title's reference to Coogan, Kripke 
and Weiss' classic article about subordination agreements under the Uniform Commercial Code. 
See Peter F. Coogan et al., The Outer Fringes of Article 9: Subordination Agreements, Security 
Interests in Money and Deposits, Negative Pledge Clauses, and Participation .4greements, 19 
HARV. L. REV. 229 (1965). 
2. For example, 26 years ago the Second Circuit observed that subordinated debt involved 
"literally billions of dollars of outstanding loans,'' and noted that a reduction in lenders' willing-
ness to participate in subordinated debt financing would be "to the detriment of the entire busi-
ness community." In re Credit Indus. Corp., 366 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1966). 
3. See Wendell H. Adair, Jr., Subordinated Debt in the 1990s: Implications for Senior and 
Junior Lenders, CoM. LENDING REv., Winter 1991-92, at 38, 38 (noting that during the 1980s, 
the market for publicly traded subordinated debt grew from $10 billion to over $200 billion). 
4. "There's a bankruptcy filing by former LBOs every day now." Louise Witt, Profitable 
Morse Shoe Collapses Under LBO Debt, BOSTON Bus. J., Feb. 4, 1991, at 3 (quoting Steven 
Frankel, retail analyst with Adams Harkness & Hill in Boston). 
5. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988). Throughout this Note, the Bankruptcy Code will be re-
ferred to as "the Code," and specific section references in the text (e.g., "section 510") are to the 
corresponding section of the Code (e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 510 (1988)), unless otherwise indicated. 
6. The only section of the Bankruptcy Code dealing with the treatment of debt subordination 
agreements is§ 510(a). See infra text accompanying notes 64-69 for a discussion of its text and 
legislative history. Section 510(a) appears relatively infrequently in reported cases. A search of 
the FBKR-CS database on WESTLAW, conducted in October 1992, revealed only 32 cases that 
discuss § 510(a). Its use is becoming more frequent, however; of those 32 cases, 10 are dated 
1990 or later. 
7. In re Holly's, Inc., 140 B.R. 643, 667 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992). 
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creditors8 in chapter 79 bankruptcies is relatively straightforward. Af-
ter payment of the priority claims listed in section 507,10 unsecured 
claims are paid pro rata if the debtor's estate contains insufficient 
funds to pay all unsecured claims in full. 11 However, if a subordina-
tion agreement governs the claims of two unsecured creditors, section 
510(a) requires that the agreement be enforced,12 and section 726 rec-
ognizes that section 510 could alter the pro rata distribution. 13 Conse-
quently, the subordinated creditor will have to tum over any 
distribution it receives to the senior creditor, resulting in "double divi-
dends" for the senior lender: the senior lender receives its own share 
of the payments, plus that of the subordinated lender. 14 
Chapter 11 bankruptcies, 15 however, present a more complex 
problem. In a chapter 11 reorganization, a confirmed reorganization 
plan, 16 not the Bankruptcy Code, determines who gets what.17 To 
ease confirmation, a debtor may propose a plan providing for partial 
payments to both senior and subordinated creditors in order to obtain 
the approval of the subordinated creditors.18 Such a plan would not 
8. Subordination agreements altering lien priority are also enforceable between secured credi-
tors. See U.C.C. § 9-316 (1990); Holly's, Inc., 140 B.R. at 670. To avoid issues arising under 
Article 9 of the U.C.C., however, the discussion in this Note is restricted to unsecured 
subordinated debt. 
9. Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988), governs liquidations. 
10. Section 507 gives priority to claims such as administrative expenses, certain employee 
wages and benefit plans, consumer deposits, and certain taxes. 
11. 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (1988); see H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 383 (1978), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6339 [hereinafter HousE REPORT] (describing pro rata 
distribution). 
12. 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (1988) provides: "A subordination agreement is enforceable in a case 
under this title to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law." 
13. Section 726 prefaces its distribution framework with the phrase "[e]xcept as provided in 
section 510 of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (1988). 
14. James L. Lopes, Contractual Subordinations and Bankruptcy, 91 BANKING L.J. 204, 223 
(1980); Reade H. Ryan, Jr., The Subordinated World of Junk Bonds, 105 BANKING L.J. 4, 5 
(1988); see also Dee M. Calligar, Subordination Agreements, 10 YALE L.J. 376, 377 (1961). For 
example, ifthe debtor's estate has $600,000 available to pay unsecured claims and owes $500,000 
each to a senior, subordinated, and general unsecured creditor, the pro rata distribution would be 
$200,000 to each creditor. However, because of the turnover obligation, the subordinated credi-
tor's share goes to the senior creditor, who C<lnsequently receives $400,000, while the general 
creditor still receives $200,000. Id. 
15. 11 u.s.c. §§ 1101-1174 (1988). 
16. See infra section II.A for a brief discussion of the confirmation process. 
17. Section 1123 governs the contents ofa plan. Among other requirements, the plan must 
"specify the treatment of any class of claims or interests that is impaired under the plan." 11 
U.S.C. § 1123(a)(3) (1988). A class is impaired if it will receive less than the full value of its 
claim according to the provisions of§ 1124. 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988). See generally RICHARD I. 
AARON, BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS§ 12.03 (1991). 
18. K.G. McGuinness & L.M. Goldman, Courts Divide on Lenders' Right to Attack Reorgan-
ization Plans, NATL. L.J., Apr. 22, 1991, at 20, 20. Several cases show examples of this type of 
plan. E.g., In re Eagle Bus Mfg., Inc., 134 B.R. 584, 591 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991) (plan allowed 
senior creditors twice the percentage recovery that subordinated creditors received); Bartle v. 
Markson Bros., Inc., 314 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1963) (plan proposed payment to senior creditors of 
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comply with the subordination agreement because the senior creditors 
would receive less than full payment, yet the subordinated creditors 
would receive some value for their claims. 
One can imagine that such a plan might be objectionable to a se-
nior creditor who bargained for the right to receive full payment 
before subordinated creditors. If the senior creditor were outvoted by 
its class, however, it might be denied the benefit of its bargain.19 As an 
illustration of the problem, consider the following hypothetical. 
Deadbeat Debtor Inc. owed $1,000,000 to its president. The president, 
concerned that the company needed more capital, signed a complete sub-
ordination agreement20 with each of five banks to induce the banks to 
lend. Each bank made a $100,000 unsecured loan to the debtor. The 
debtor, now in chapter 11, proposes a reorganization plan as follows: (1) 
there are two classes, one containing the banks, the other containing the 
subordinated creditor; (2) the subordinated debt will receive ten cents on 
the dollar, while the senior bank debt will receive fifty cents on the dol-
lar; (3) the subordinated creditor need not tum over its payments to the 
senior creditors. The subordinated creditor approves the plan. Of the 
senior creditors, four of the banks - 80% of the amount and number of 
claims, sufficient for acceptance21-approve the plan, but one, Frugal 
Financial, does not. Frugal argues that it lent to the debtor relying on 
the terms of the subordination agreement: it never would have lent to a 
troubled company that had $1,000,000 in debt unless it was assured of 
full payment before the $1,000,000 creditor received anything. The 
other banks try to convince Frugal that they are better off taking fifty 
cents on the dollar and being done with it, since liquidation would bring 
less, 22 but Frugal is adamant that it is entitled to enforce its bargain. 
The bankruptcy court confirms the plan based on the consent of the two 
classes, despite Frugal's objection, and Frugal appeals the confirmation 
order on the grounds that the bankruptcy court had no authority to 
override a contract between two creditors, regardless of the plan's 
terms.23 
47.5% ofthefr claim in cash and to subordinated creditors of 15% in cash and 85% in notes); In 
re Equity Funding Corp. of Am., 416 F. Supp. 132, 152 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (plan proposed paying 
76.1 % to 80% of senior claims and 31.5% of subordinated claims); In re Dodge-Freedman Poul-
try Co., 148 F. Supp. 647, 648 (D.N.H. 1956) (plan proposed paying 15% of all unsecured 
claims). 
19. Section l 14l(a) provides: "[T]he provisions of a confirmed plan bind ••• any creditor •.. 
whether or not such creditor ... has accepted the plan." 11 U.S.C. § 114l(a) (1988). Thus, 
when a class has satisfied the standards for acceptance in§ l 126(c), see infra note 81, the wishes 
of a single class member who disagrees with the majority of its class ordinarily become irrelevant. 
20. See infra section I.A for a definition of complete, as opposed to contingent, subordination 
agreements. 
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1988); infra section II.A. 
22. Assuming that this statement is correct, it prevents Frugal from arguing that the plan 
violates the best-interests test of§ l 129(a)(7)(A)(ii). See infra section II.A. 
23. This hypothetical is admittedly unrealistic on at least two counts: banks are unlikely to 
make unsecured loans under the conditions stated, and Frugal appears to be acting irrationally. 
Despite these criticisms, the hypothetical is useful both because it is a possible, if unlikely, scena-
rio, and because it clearly illustrates the problem. 
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This Note focuses on the options a senior creditor in Frugal's posi-
tion may have when a reorganization plan provides for payments in 
violation of a subordination agreement that the creditor wishes to en-
force. Part I explains the different types of subordination agreements 
and discusses their treatment under pre-Code bankruptcy law and 
under the Bankruptcy Code. Because of the dearth of case law regard-
ing nonconsenting senior lenders and subordination agreements, Part 
II considers a question in a related area of bankruptcy law where more 
authority exists: whether a reorganization plan may release a 
nonbankrupt guarantor from its obligations under the guaranty agree-
ment. Part II examines the split in authority on this issue. Part III 
considers how bankruptcy courts should treat plans containing provi-
sions that violate subordination agreements, using the guarantor-re-
lease case law for guidance. This Note concludes that when a senior 
creditor wishes to enforce a subordination agreement that a reorgani-
zation plan purports to violate, the bankruptcy court should refuse to 
confirm the plan even if the senior creditor is outvoted by its class.24 
I. SUBORDINATION AGREEMENTS 
This Part examines the law governing subordination agreements. 
Section I.A distinguishes between different types of subordination 
agreemeµts and considers the different purposes they might serve. 
Section l.B analyzes the law governing subordination agreements in 
bankruptcy prior to the passage of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.25 
The pre-Code law is still relevant, as courts often look to it in deciding 
how to construe subordination agreements under the Code.26 Section 
l.C discusses the language and legislative history of Code section 
510(a) governing subordination agreements. 
A. Types of Subordination Agreements 
The basic concept behind subordinated debt is simple: the 
subordinated creditor agrees that under certain circumstances, the 
claims of specified senior creditors must be paid in full before any pay-
ment may be made to, and retained by, the subordinated creditor.2' 
24. The related question of whether a senior creditor may mount a collateral attack against a 
subordinated creditor to recover payments made pursuant to a confirmed plan in violation of a 
subordination agreement is beyond the scope of this Note. For some differing views on this and 
related questions, see Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1987) (disallowing 
collateral attack on a guarantor on res judicata grounds); In re A.J. Mackay Co., 50 B.R. 756 
(Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (allowing collateral attack on a guarantor despite res judicata argument); 
Lopes, supra note 14, at 224-25 (speculating that res judicata would bar attack on a subordinated 
creditor); McGuinness & Goldman, supra note 18 (noting arguments on both sides). 
25. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended 
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)). 
26. See infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
27. Calligar, supra note 14, at 376. 
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Debt subordination agreements28 involve three players: (1) a common 
debtor, who owes money to two creditors or groups of creditors; (2) a 
subordinated creditor, who may not be paid until the senior debt is 
satisfied;29 and (3) a senior creditor, who must be paid before any 
subordinated creditor receives any payment. 30 The senior and 
subordinated creditors "may each be a named individual, or a member 
of a specific or open-ended class."31 Implicit in subordination agree-
ments is a "turnover obligation," which provides that if the 
subordinated creditor receives any payment before the senior creditor 
is paid in full, the subordinated creditor must tum the payment over 
to the senior creditor.32 
Details in subordination agreements vary. A complete subordina-
tion means that upon execution of the agreement, the subordinated 
creditor will receive no payment until the senior creditor is paid in 
full.33 An inchoate 34 or contingent35 subordination permits some pay-
ments to the subordinated lender - interest, principal, or both - un-
less the debtor defaults on the senior debt. 36 Bankruptcy always 
triggers the default provision of a contingent subordination. 37 
One can also distinguish private from institutional subordination 
agreements. 38 A private subordination agreement is between a specific 
senior creditor and a specific junior creditor.39 These agreements usu-
ally arise when a creditor who is an insider of the debtor becomes 
concerned that the company needs more cash and induces large lend-
28. This Note deals only with subordination that is agreed to by the parties involved. Section 
510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code permits a court to use "equitable subordination" to reduce the 
priority of the claims of a creditor who has been "guilty of misconduct." S. REP. No. 989, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5860 [hereinafter SENATE RE-
PORT]. Equitable subordination involves entirely different principles and policies of bankruptcy 
law than does subordination by agreement, and is therefore beyond the scope of this Note. 
29. This is always true for complete subordinations. Contingent subordinations, in contrast, 
may permit some payment to subordinated creditors absent default on the senior debt. See infra 
notes 33-37 and accompanying text. 
30. Coogan et al., supra note 1, at 233; see also In re Holly's, Inc., 140 B.R. 643, 668 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mich. 1992). 
31. Coogan et al., supra note 1, at 233. 
32. See Calligar, supra note 14, at 377; supra note 14 and accompanying text. Again, this is 
strictly true only for complete subordinations. See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. 
33. Ryan, supra note 14, at 5; Calligar, supra note 14, at 378. 
34. Calligar, supra note 14, at 377-78. Calligar's use of the term "inchoate" has been criti-
cized as suggesting incorrectly that some further action is required by the senior lender to enforce 
its rights. See Edward Everett, Subordinated Debt - Nature and Enforcement, 20 Bus. LAW. 
953, 956 n.8 (1965); Coogan et al., supra note 1, at 234 n.20. 
35. David G. Carlson, A Theory of Contractual Debt Subordination and Lien Priority, 38 
V AND. L. REV. 975, 983 (1985). 
36. See Calligar, supra note 14, at 377-78. 
37. See Lopes, supra note 14, at 206. 
38. Id. at 206-07. 
39. A private subordination agreement could potentially involve more than one junior 
lender. Id. at 207. 
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ers to lend to the troubled company by agreeing to subordinate its own 
claims to those of the outside lenders.40 The principal players in pri-
vate subordination agreements are the two creditors who have agreed 
between themselves to reorder payment priorities; the debtor may or 
may _not be a party to the agreement. 
In contrast, institutional subordination agreements involve the 
debtor and subordinated creditors as parties, with the senior creditor 
usually a third-party beneficiary to the agreement.41 Perhaps the best 
known type of institutional subordination is the now infamous ''junk 
bond." Junk bonds are high-yield securities issued in large amounts 
by a company that wishes to raise capital; they are usually 
subordinated to other debt of the debtor.42 The subordination ex-
plains the high yield: investors who purchase junk bonds take a sub-
stantial risk that in the event of insolvency their obligations will not be 
paid, so they receive a risk premium in the form of high interest rates. 
Agreements governing institutional subordinations usually leave the 
class of senior creditors open; a creditor advancing funds after the 
agreement's execution joins the existing class of senior creditors.43 
Private subordinations are usually complete; institutional ones gen-
erally are contingent.44 This is because complete subordination for-
bids any payment to the subordinated creditor before the senior debt is 
paid off. Thus, a complete subordination provides maximum induce-
ment for lenders entering a private subordination agreement. How-
ever, purchase of completely subordinated debt "would not ordinarily 
constitute an appropriate investment for institutional investors"45 be-
cause all payment on the debt would be forbidden for an indeterminate 
time. 
B. Subordination Agreements Under Pre-Code Law 
Prior to the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978,46 the status 
of subordination agreements in bankruptcy was unclear. No provision 
40. See In re Holly's, Inc., 140 B.R. 643, 668 n.37 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992) (quoting Carl-
son, supra note 35, at 976-77); In re The Lantana Motel, 124 B.R. 252, 256 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
1990). 
41. See Lopes, supra note 14, at 206-07. 
42. See Ryan, supra note 14, at 4. 
43. Everett, supra note 34, at 956 (quoting a typical institutional subordination provision 
providing in part that the subordinated note shall be "subordinate and junior in right of payment 
.•. to all indebtedness of the Company for money borrowed, whether outstanding at the date of 
the Notes or incu"ed after the date of the Notes" (emphasis added}); see also Coogan et al., supra 
note 1, at 233. 
44. Lopes, supra note 14, at 206-07. 
45. Everett, supra note 34, at 956. 
46. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended 
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)). 
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of the Bankruptcy Act of 189847 addressed the treatment of subordina-
tion agreements. Subordinated creditors wishing to escape a subordi-
nation agreement generally argued that because the Act required pro 
rata distribution of assets to all claims other than those granted statu-
tory priority or that were secured, 48 the subordination agreement 
could not be enforced.49 Courts responded with one of four theories to 
justify enforcement of the agreements despite the apparent conflict 
with the statute.50 Briefly stated, the four theories are: 
(1) The subordination agreement creates an equitable lien in favor of 
the senior creditor; 
(2) The subordination agreement creates an equitable assignment to 
the senior creditor of the subordinated debt claim in bankruptcy and 
dividends payable thereon; 
(3) The [subordinated creditor] holds the dividends received as con-
structive trustee for the holder of the senior debt; 
( 4) The bankruptcy court has the power to distribute the bankrupt 
estate in accord with the rights of the parties as fixed by their own 
contract.51 
When facing a case involving enforcement of subordination agree-
ments, courts continue to recite these four theories. 52 However, no 
court has adopted any of the first three theories since 1956.53 Courts 
and commentators agree that the contract theory is "the most logi-
cally supportable and sensible of all the theories."54 The other three 
theories appear to be of historical interest only. 
The basis for the contract theory is that "the bankruptcy court has 
the jurisdictional power to enforce the contractual rights of the parties 
47. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). References in the 
text to "the Act" are to the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. 
48. Bankruptcy Act § 65a, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1976) (repealed 1978) provided that 
"[d]ividends of an equal per centum shall be declared and paid on all allowed claims, except such 
as have priority or are secured." 
49. See, e.g., In re Credit Indus. Corp., 366 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1966); In re Aktiebolaget 
Kreuger & Toll, 96 F.2d 768, 770 (2d Cir. 1938). 
50. See Everett, supra note 34, at 961-62 ("[T]he courts appear to have uniformly enforced or 
implemented the subordination agreements presented to them and have thereby clearly estab-
lished the principle that subordination agreements will be enforced for the benefit of the senior 
debt." (footnote omitted)). 
51. Calligar, supra note 14, at 384 (footnotes omitted). A fifth theory has been proposed by 
Carlson, supra note 35. Carlson believes that subordination agreements should be viewed as 
actual assignments of the junior claim from the subordinated lender to the senior lender. Id. at 
996. So far, no court has adopted Carlson's theory. 
52. See, e.g., In re Holly's, Inc., 140 B.R. 643, 668 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992); In re Smith, 
77 B.R. 624, 627 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987). 
53. The court in In re Dodge-Freedman Poultry Co., 148 F. Supp. 647, 651-52 (D.N.H. 
1956), adopted the constructive trust theory. The equitable lien theory appears in In re Geo. P. 
Schinzel & Son, 16 F.2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1926). The equitable assignment theory appears in In re 
Handy-Andy Community Stores, 2 F. Supp. 97 (W.D. La. 1932). 
54. Calligar, supra note 14, at 388; see also Marvin D. Heileson & Morris W. Hirsch, Private 
Subordination Agreements and the U.C.C.: Is Section 1-209 an Un-Wyse Solution?, 38 Bus. 
LAW. 555, 562 (1983); Lopes, supra note 14, at 209. 
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in interest[] when distributing a bankrupt estate."55 This theory first 
appeared in the 1930s in Bird & Sons Sales Corp. v. Tobin 56 and In re 
Aktiebolaget Kreuger & Toll. 51 In both of these cases, the 
subordinated creditors argued that the language of section 65a of the 
Act58 created an absolute system of pro rata distribution of the bank-
rupt's assets, and that "the court is without power to recognize rights, 
however just and equitable, which some members of the class may be 
shown to have against others."59 Both courts flatly rejected this argu-
ment, holding that the statute "means no more than that dividends 
paid to creditors shall be pro rata except where there is a priority given 
by law or by lawjul contractual arrangement between the parties."60 
Other cases have agreed that recognizing and enforcing the parties' 
contractual arrangements is the proper way to effectuate subordina-
tion agreements in bankruptcy, 61 including cases using a third-party 
beneficiary theory where the senior creditor was not a party to the 
agreement. 62 The Second Circuit has perfectly summarized this posi-
tion: "If the terms of the contracts are clear and unambiguous, it is 
unnecessary to resort to strained theories to evaluate and determine 
the proper respective positions of the parties involved."63 
C. Subordination Agreements Under the Bankruptcy Code 
Unlike the Act, the Code mandates enforcement of subordination 
agreements in bankruptcy. Section SlO(a) of the Code provides: "A 
subordination agreement is enforceable in a case under this title to the 
55. Calligar, supra note 14, at 388. 
56. 78 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1935). 
57. 96 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1938). 
58. See supra note 48 for the text of § 65a. 
59. Bird, 18 F.2d at 373; see also Kreuger & Toll, 96 F.2d at 770. 
60. Kreuger & Toll, 96 F.2d at 770 (citing Bird, 18 F.2d at 371) (emphasis added). 
61. See, e.g., First Natl. Bank of Hollywood v. American Foam Rubber Corp., 530 F.2d 450, 
454 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Credit Indus. Corp., 366 F.2d 402, 407 (2d Cir. 1966); In re Holly's, 
Inc., 140 B.R. 643, 668-69 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992); In re Smith, 77 B.R. 624, 627 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio 1987); In re Eaton Factors Co., 3 B.R. 20, 22-23 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980); see also 
U.C.C. § 1-209 cmt. 2 (1990). 
62. E.g., Elias v. Clarke, 143 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1944). For a discussion of Elias, see Everett, 
supra note 34, at 966-67. Courts in the past may have been reluctant to use the contract theory 
alone because it often would have required enforcing rights of a party who had not signed the 
contract at a time when third-party beneficiary theory was not universally accepted. See Lopes, 
supra note 14, at 209; Everett, supra note 34, at 964. Massachusetts, for example, did not accept 
third-party beneficiary theory until 1979. See Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Servs., 392 N.E.2d 
1045, 1046, 1051 (Mass. 1979); see also Everett, supra note 34, at 972-73 (noting that as of 1965, 
subordination agreements governed by Massachusetts law "would presumably be [enforceable] 
..• upon the basis of 'equitable subordination' .•• and would therefore not need to rely upon the 
third party beneficiary contract doctrine"). Today, however, all American jurisdictions accept 
third-party beneficiary theory as a basic principle of contract law. See CHARLES L. KNAPP & 
NATHAN M. CRYsrAL, PROBLEMS IN CoNTRACT LAW 1106 (2d ed. 1987); see also REsrATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS §§ 302, 304 (1979). 
63. In re Credit Indus. Corp., 366 F.2d 402, 407 (2d Cir. 1966). 
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same extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law."64 Section 510(a) therefore codified existing case 
law.65 However, because section 510(a) simply refers to "applicable 
nonbankruptcy law" as the basis for enforcement, courts have contin-
ued to look to case law under the Act for guidance when confronted 
with a subordination agreement. 66 
The section's legislative history is brief, and bears repeating in full: 
Subsection (a) requires the court to enforce subordination agreements. 
A subordination agreement will not be enforced, however, in a reorgani-
zation case in which the class that is the beneficiary of the agreement has 
accepted, as specified in proposed 11 U.S.C. § 1126, a plan that waives 
[its] rights under the agreement. Otherwise, the agreement would pre-
vent just what chapter 11 contemplates: that seniors may give up rights 
to juniors in the interest of confirmation of a plan and rehabilitation of 
the debtor. 67 
The meaning of the legislative history is somewhat unclear. It may 
simply stand for the unexceptionable proposition that section 510(a) 
does not preclude senior creditors from waiving their rights under sub-
ordination agreements in order to ease confirmation of a chapter 11 
plan. It could also, perhaps, be read to suggest that a class of senior 
creditors may waive its rights under subordination agreements over the 
objection of dissenters within the same class. 68 As Collier notes, how-
ever, "[t]here is no support for this view ... in the text of section 
64. 11 U.S.C. § SlO(a) (1988). 
65. See, e.g., Mihalko v. Continental Bank and Trust Co. (In re Mihalko), 87 B.R. 357, 364 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); Beatrice Foods Co. v. Hart Ski Mfg. Co. (In re Hart Ski Mfg. Co.), 5 
B.R. 734, 735 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980); In re Leasing Consultants, Inc., 2 B.R. 165, 168 n.l 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
66. See, e.g., In re Holly's, Inc., 140 B.R. 643, 668-72 & n.38 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992) 
(discussing numerous pre-Code cases); In re Smith, 77 B.R. 624, 627 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) 
(citing the Schinze/, Handy-Andy, Dodge-Freedman, and Bird cases, as well as Calligar, supra 
note 14, for the four theories of enforcement discussed supra section I.B, and adopting the con-
tract theory). 
67. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 359, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6315. The 
Senate Report contains identical language. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 74, reprinted 
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5860. The commentary from both of these reports is actually to an 
earlier version of the statute, numbered SlO(a)(l), which read: "[T]he court shall ... enforce any 
subordination agreement to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law." S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 405 (1977), reprinted in App. 3 WILLIAM M. 
CoLLIER, CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY part VII (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1992); H.R. 
8200, 95th Cong., lst Sess. 393 (1978), reprinted in App. 3 CoLLIER, supra, part III. Following 
the issuance of the reports, the entire text of the proposed Code was read into the Congressional 
Record by Representative Edwards, and that text contained § SlO(a) as it now stands. 124 
CONG. REc. 32,350, 32,361 (1978). Arguably, the earlier version mandates more aggressive en-
forcement of subordination agreements than the present version, as it contained the command 
"shall enforce." However, there is no explanation for or discussion of the change, nor did Rep. 
Edwards even mention the new § SlO(a) in his extended commentary to the proposed Code. See 
id. at 32,398 (mentioning in passing the old§ SlO(a)(l); discussing in detail only§ SlO(c)(l)). It 
therefore seems more reasonable to assume that the language was simply altered when the sec-
tion was renumbered, with no intention to change the substantive content of the statute. 
68. This reading would result from emphasizing the word "class" in the sentence: "A subor-
dination agreement will not be enforced, however, in a reorganization case in which the class that 
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510(a) itself."69 
Section 510(a)'s simple rule that subordination agreements are to 
be enforced as they would be outside ofbankruptcy70 lends some plau-
sibility to Frugal Financial's argument that the bankruptcy court ex-
ceeded its authority in confirming a plan that violated a subordination 
agreement against its beneficiary's will. 71 If Frugal can establish that 
the plan violates section 510(a)'s seemingly clear language requiring 
that subordination agreements be enforced under applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law, then Frugal should win on appeal, because a plan must 
comply with all applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to be 
confirmed. 72 The fact that Frugal was outvoted would then become 
irrelevant. The rest of this Note attempts to resolve this problem. 
II. RELEASE OF GUARANTORS 
No reported case since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code 
deals directly with the rights of nonconsenting senior creditors under 
subordination agreements.73 However, subordinated creditors have 
been analogized to limited guarantors for the senior creditor. As one 
commentator has noted, "[t]he essence of the subordination agreement 
is a guaranty or indemnification, limited by the amount payable to or 
received by the subordinated creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding."74 
Thus, although the nature of the obligations of a guarantor and a 
subordinated creditor differ somewhat, their similarities may justify 
is the beneficiary of the agreement has accepted .•• a plan that waives [its] rights under the 
agreement." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 359, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6315. 
69. 2 WILLIAM M. CoLLIER, CoLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 11 510.05, at 510-14 (Law-
rence P. King ed., 3d ed. 1991). 
70. Outside of bankruptcy, each senior creditor holds an ordinary contract right that other 
senior creditors cannot waive against the holder's will, even if they are all parties to the same 
agreement. Enforcing a subordination agreement as it would be enforced outside of bankruptcy 
therefore suggests that each senior creditor may choose to enforce its rights irrespective of the 
will of others. 
71. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23. 
72. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(l) (1988). 
73. Two commentators have asked, but have not definitively answered, what would happen if 
a nonconsenting senior creditor wished to enforce its rights under a subordination agreement 
purportedly waived by its class. See Lopes, supra note 14, at 224; Ralph R. Mabey & Penrod W. 
Keith, Contractual and Equitable Subordination in Bankruptcy, in PRACTICING LA w INm-
TUTE, DEALING WITH THE REORGANIZING DEBTOR 1990: TRANSACTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, 
AND LmGATION *5 (1990) (available on WESTLAW, PLI database, citation 545 PLl/Comm 
241); cf. McGuinness & Goldman, supra note 18, at 20 (asking the related question discussed 
supra note 24). In addition, the author of this Note has learned that at least one major New 
York law firm has requested research memoranda on this issue, suggesting that it has arisen in 
the "real world." 
74. Lopes, supra note 14, at 227; see also McGuinness & Goldman, supra note 18, at 20. In 
contrast, a true guarantor is responsible for the entire debt owed to the senior creditor, regardless 
of whether the guarantor has received or ever expects to receive any payment from the debtor. 
See GEORGE E. OSBORNE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP 10 (1966). 
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using the better-developed law of guarantor releases to assist in ana-
lyzing subordination agreements. 
This Part examines the authority of a bankruptcy court to modify 
guaranty agreements in chapter 11 proceedings. Section II.A presents 
a brief overview of the confirmation process under the Code. Section 
11.B examines the "restrictive view," which holds that the bankruptcy 
court may not alter guaranty agreements, even if the creditor consents 
to the alteration during the confirmation process. Section II.C dis-
cusses the "expansive view," adopted by a few courts, which allows 
bankruptcy courts to release the liability of third parties against the 
will of those parties' creditors. Finally, section II.D considers a mid-
dle course that allows creditors to release third parties from liability 
voluntarily, but does not permit involuntary release. 
A. Plan Confirmation in Chapter 11 
Any reorganization plan divides up all of the claims of creditors 
and other interest holders in the debtor into classes and then specifies 
the treatment that each class will receive.75 The plan proponent, usu-
ally the debtor, 76 assigns the claims to particular classes. However, 
the plan may only place claims or interests in a class that contains 
other claims or interests that are "substantially similar."77 The plan 
must also specify which classes are "impaired" under the plan. 78 Im-
pairing a class means, essentially, "altering any of the legal, equitable, 
or contractual rights of the claim or interest."79 
A reorganization plan may be confirmed under chapter 11 in either 
of two ways. If all of the impaired classes80 vote to accept the plan, 81 
75. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (1988). 
76. Section l 12l(b) provides for an "exclusivity period" of 120 days during which only the 
debtor may propose a plan. Section l 121(d) provides that the court may extend the exclusivity 
period "for cause," and in practice, such extensions are routinely granted. JAMES J. WHITE & 
RAYMOND T. NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 71, 528 (2d ed. 1992); see 
Discussion, 11 CoRNELL L. REv. 1105, 1111 (1992) (comments of the Hon. Edith H. Jones). As 
a result, the debtor proposes the plan in the vast majority of cases. See WHITE & NIMMER, 
supra, at 528. 
77. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1988). 
78. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(2), (3) (1988). 
79. AARON, supra note 17, § 12.03[1], at 12-13. More precisely, § 1124 defines a class as 
impaired unless it satisfies any one of three conditions: all rights to which the claim entitles the 
holder remain unaltered; the plan cures any default, pays damages, and otherwise does not alter 
rights; or the plan pays the claim in full on the effective date of the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1124 
(1988). 
80. Section 1129(a)(8)(B) provides that if a class is not impaired, its vote is not necessary for 
confirmation. 
81. Section 1126(c) provides that a class of claims accepts the plan if creditors holding "at 
least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in number of the allowed claims of such 
class" vote for the plan. Section l 126(d) provides that a class of interests accepts the plan if 
holders of "at least two-thirds in amount of the allowed interests of such class" vote to accept. A 
creditor with a right to payment would hold a claim rather than an interest. See 11 U.S.C.A. 
§ 101(5) (West Supp. 1992) (defining "claim"). 
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and the plan otherwise complies with section 1129(a), 82 the court 
"shall confirm" it. 83 If, however, any impaired class votes to reject the 
plan, but the plan satisfies the other requirements of section 1129(a), 
the plan may still be confirmed by "cramdown" if the plan meets the 
additional requirements of section 1129(b ). 84 
The protections afforded dissenting individual cr~ditors and dis-
senting classes of creditors deserve a brief examination. Any creditor 
that votes to reject the plan, whether or not that creditor's class votes 
for the plan, receives th~ protection of the best-interests test. This test, 
codified in section 1129(a)(7), requires that a dissenting creditor re-
ceive "property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is 
not less than the amount that such [creditor] would so receive or re-
tain if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7."85 In a chapter 7 
liquidation, the debtor's assets are sold piecemeal and the proceeds 
mechanically divided among creditors according to the priorities es-
tablished in section 726;86 a dissenting creditor in chapter 11 therefore 
must receive at least the amount it would in such a liquidation. 87 
If an entire class of unsecured creditors votes to reject the plan, the 
class is entitled to the protection of the absolute priority rule, codified 
in section 1129(b )(2)(B), in addition to the best-interests test. 88 The 
absolute priority rule requires that the plan either pay all claims in the 
82. Section 1129(a) sets forth 13 conditions, all of which must be satisfied for confirmation by 
consent of the creditors. Briefly, they are: (1) the plan complies with applicable provisions of 
title 11; (2) the plan proponent complies with applicable provisions of title 11; (3) the plan is 
proposed legally and in good faith; (4) the court knows about any payments by the proponent, 
debtor, or person issuing securities or acquiring property, for costs in connection with the case; 
(5) all insiders' identities are disclosed; (6) any government-regulated rate change has been ap-
proved by the appropriate agency; (7) the best-interests test is satisfied; (8) every class either 
accepts the plan or is not impaired; (9) certain priority claims are paid in full; (10) at least one 
impaired class accepts the plan, not including insiders; (11) reorganization is likely to succeed; 
(12) all filing fees have been paid; and (13) certain retiree benefits are paid. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) 
(1988). 
83. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (1988). 
84. Section 1129(b) requires that, to be confirmable on cramdown, a plan "not discriminate 
unfairly,'' and that it be "fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that 
is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(l) (1988). Section 
1129(b)(2) defines the "fair and equitable" test, which includes the "absolute priority rule." See 
infra text accompanying notes 88-91. The Code provides no further definition of what discrimi-
nating unfairly means in this context. 
85. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1988). 
86. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. 
87. Although in theory a single creditor can prevent confirmation of a plan by showing that 
the plan violates the best-interests test, in practice such violations are difficult to prove. 
[T]he problems of proof associated with valuing a business are very complex ..•• [T]here is 
typically a very large disparity between the liquidation and going-concern values of a busi-
ness. Even if the creditor is being unfairly treated under a plan, the plan, usually based on a 
going concern value, is likely to net more for the creditor than in a liquidation •••• 
Lopes, supra note 14, at 229-30. 
88. Secured creditors also receive protection under the absolute priority rule, see 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) (1988), but that provision is not relevant to the discussion in this Note. See 
supra note 8. 
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dissenting class in full, or provide that "the holder of any claim or 
interest that is junior to the claims of [the dissenting] class will not 
receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or 
interest any property. " 89 For example, if a plan proposed to pay gen-
eral creditors fifty cents on the dollar for their claims and allowed 
shareholders to retain some interest in the reorganized company, the 
plan could not be confirmed by cram.down over the dissent of the class 
of general creditors. The plan would violate the absolute priority rule 
because the general creditors would not be paid in full, yet a class 
junior to them, the shareholders, would retain some property. 90 The 
special protection of section 1129(b) applies only to those classes vot-
ing to reject the plan; a class that accepts a plan ultimately confirmed 
by cram.down is not entitled to the protection of the absolute priority 
rule.91 · 
B. Guarantor Release: The Restrictive View 
Under the restrictive view, the bankruptcy court has no authority 
to release an obligation of someone who has not filed a bankruptcy 
petition. Section 524( e) of the Code provides that "discharge of a debt 
of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the 
property of any other entity for, such debt."92 Code section 524(e) 
was derived from section 16 of the 1898 Act,93 which provided that 
"[t]he liability of a person who is a co-debtor with, or guarantor or in 
any manner a surety for, a bankrupt shall not be altered by the dis-
charge of such bankrupt. "94 Courts adopting the restrictive view have 
interpreted these sections as prohibiting the bankruptcy courts from 
releasing guarantors' (or other codebtors') obligations, even when no 
creditor objects to the release.95 An analysis of whether these courts 
89. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1988) (emphasis added). 
90. See generally Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under 
the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979). 
91. Section 1129(b)(l) applies the "fair and equitable" test, which includes the absolute pri-
ority rule, only "with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has 
not accepted, the plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(l) (1988) (emphasis added). See also Klee, supra 
note 90, at 141. 
92. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (1988). The statute allows an exception when dealing with commu-
nity property as defined in § 524(a)(3). That exception is not relevant to the question of releasing 
guarantors. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(3) (1988). 
93. See, e.g., Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985). 
94. 11 U.S.C. § 34 (1976) (repealed 1978). 
95. E.g., In re Western Real Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d 592, 601-02 (10th Cir. 1990); Sea-
port Automotive Warehouse v. Rohnert Park Auto Parts (In re Rohnert Park Auto Parts), 113 
B.R. 610, 616 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990); American Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re 
American Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 625-26 (9th Cir. 1989); Underhill 769 F.2d at 1432; 
Union Carbide Corp. v. Newboles, 686 F.2d 593, 595 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (pre-Code 
case); In re General Homes Corp., FGMC, 134 B.R. 853, 861 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991); In re 222 
Liberty Assocs., 108 B.R. 971, 996-97 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990); Mellon Bank v. Siegel, 96 B.R. 
505, 506 (E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Future Energy Corp., 83 B.R. 470, 485-86 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
1988); In re Elsinore Shore Assocs., 91 B.R. 238, 256 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988); In re Scranes, Inc., 
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are correct requires answering two questions: First, does the bank-
ruptcy court have subject matter jurisdiction over agreements with 
guarantors? Second, assuming that the court has jurisdiction, does the 
Code empower the bankruptcy court to release guarantors' 
obligations? 
1. Jurisdiction 
If bankruptcy courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over 
guaranty agreements between creditors and guarantors, then the 
Bankruptcy Code is irrelevant. Bankruptcy courts, like any other 
courts, cannot affect matters outside their jurisdiction. 96 Since the 
Marathon crisis,97 sections 157 and 1334 of title 28 of the United 
States Code have governed the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts. Sec-
tion 1334(b) provides that "the district courts shall have original but 
not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, 
or arising in or related to cases under title 11."98 Section 157{a), in 
tum, provides that the district courts "may provide" that cases cov-
ered by section 1334(b) "shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for 
the district. "99 Therefore, any proceeding even "related to cases under 
title 11"100 falls within the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction whenever 
the district court's local rule allows referral of such proceedings. All 
district courts have such rules in effect.101 
If a proceeding against a guarantor of the bankrupt debtor is not 
"related" to the case under title 11, then the bankruptcy court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction over the guaranty agreement. In American 
67 B.R. 985, 989 (Banlcr. N.D. Ohio 1986); Hat-Hanseatische Anlage v. Sago Palms Joint Ven-
ture (In re Sago Palms Joint Venture), 39 B.R. 9, 9 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984). 
96. However, if a court acts outside its subject matter jurisdiction and the question is not 
pursued on appeal, the judgment may not be attacked collaterally. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 
165 (1938). Whether this rule applies to a confirmed reorganization plan is a subject of some 
debate. See supra note 24. 
97. In Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), the 
Supreme Court declared Congress' grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts under the original 
1978 Code unconstitutional, engendering a two-year struggle to create a valid jurisdictional 
scheme for bankruptcy courts. See generally WHITE & NIMMER, supra note 76, at 95-99. 
98. 28 u.s.c. § 1334(b) (1988). 
99. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1988). 
100. 28 u.s.c. § 1334(b) (1988). 
101. AARON, supra note 17, § 3.02[1], at 3-11. However, ifthe proceeding is a "related" but 
not a "core" proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1988), the bankruptcy court is restricted to 
"submit[ting] proposed findings of fact and conclusions oflaw to the district court" by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 157(c)(l) (1988), unless all parties consent to having the bankruptcy court resolve the matter. 
28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (1988). Without the parties' consent, the district court must enter the final 
order, and must review de novo "those matters to which any party has timely and specifically 
objected" from the bankruptcy judge's findings. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(l) (1988). Some commenta-
tors believe that there will be little practical difference between a bankruptcy court's order in a 
core proceeding and its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in a "related" matter. 
See WHITE & NIMMER, supra note 76, at 99. 
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Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp., 102 however, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that guaranties may be sufficiently "related" to bring the 
agreements within the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court. The guaran-
tors in American Hardwoods were the president and vice president of 
the debtor. They sought an injunction permanently restraining the 
creditor from enforcing the guaranty on the grounds that "pursuance 
by [creditor] of its state court action against the [guarantors] would 
irreparably harm [debtor's] efforts to confirm and administer a reor-
ganization plan."103 The court adopted the Third Circuit's definition 
of "related" proceedings, which held that if "the outcome of the pro-
ceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being adminis-
tered in bankruptcy,"104 the proceeding fell within the bankruptcy 
court's jurisdiction. The court then noted that if the creditor were 
permitted to collect on the guaranty, it would probably do so by tak-
ing possession of the guarantors' stock in the debtor. That action 
would leave the guarantors with "little incentive to operate [debtor] 
and maintain the reorganization plan."105 The court therefore found 
that "[creditor's] enforcement of the judgment against the [guaran-
tors] 'could conceivably' affect the administration of [debtor's] 
plan," 106 and consequently that the bankruptcy court had subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over the motion for a permanent injunction against the 
creditor. 
The central role of the debtor's guarantors in the management of 
the debtor's estate, influential in the American Hardwoods court's de-
termination that the action on the guaranty could affect the reorgani-
zation, is quite common.107 Often an insider, such as Deadbeat 
Debtor's president in the Frugal Financial case, 108 personally guaran-
tees obligations of the company to increase lenders' willingness to 
lend, much as insiders subordinate their claims against the debtor to 
those of outside lenders.109 In either case, the insider has a personal 
stake in the company's success, and is willing to incur some personal 
102. 885 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1989). 
103. American Hardwoods, 885 F.2d at 622. 
104. 885 F.2d at 623 (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984)); see 
also 17 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRAcrtCE AND PROCEDURE§ 4106, at 444 n.26 
(2d ed. 1988) (adopting the same definition of a "related" proceeding). 
105. 885 F.2d at 624. Because the guarantors were president and vice president of the 
debtor, this consideration was critical to the case. 
106. 885 F.2d at 624. 
107. The insider guarantor often becomes important in another bankruptcy context: when a 
bankruptcy trustee seeks to recover payments to outsider creditors, made outside the ninety-day 
preference period but inside the one-year insider preference period, on debts guaranteed by an 
insider as preferences for the benefit of the insider. The issue has sparked controversy among 
courts and commentators. See Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989), 
and authorities cited therein, 874 F.2d at 1189 nn.2 & 3. 
108. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
109. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
296 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:281 
financial risk to encourage outside lenders to invest. 110 
A result contrary to American Hardwoods appears in Bill Roderick 
Distributing, Inc. v. A.J. Mackay Co. 111 Mackay involved a confirmed 
reorganization plan containing a provision that forbade any action 
against the guarantor if the debtor remained current with payments 
under the plan. The creditor did not object to the provision, nor did it 
appeal the plan's confirmation.112 Relying on the plan, the guarantor 
stopped making payments to the creditor. The creditor then sought a 
state court judgment against the guarantor, and the guarantor re-
quested an order from the bankruptcy court enjoining the state court 
action. The bankruptcy court granted the order, finding that the cred-
itor was bound by the terms of the confirmed plan.113 
On appeal, the district court held that the bankruptcy court had 
exceeded its jurisdiction both in confirming the plan protecting the 
guarantor and in issuing the order enjoining the creditor's state court 
proceeding. The court was emphatic in its holding: 
The confirmed plan contains two provisions which purport to protect 
[guarantor] from creditor's claims. These provisions are beyond the au-
thority of the bankruptcy court to confirm, since [guarantor] is not a 
party to this lawsuit and these provisions do not involve assets of the 
bankruptcy estate. 
This court is convinced that stays preventing creditors from proceed-
ing against non-bankrupt codebtors are granted all too often. A bank-
ruptcy court does not have the jurisdiction to grant such a stay simply to 
"assist" the debtor in reorganizing, or to relieve "pressure" on the 
debtor. 
The bankruptcy court is limited in its authority to carry out the pro-
visions of the federal bankruptcy statutes by the fundamental require-
ments of jurisdiction. It cannot exceed those limits no matter how 
compelling the need to do so.114 
Oddly, the court never discussed the provisions of the United States 
Code governing the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts, nor did it make 
any attempt to square its pronouncement that "[j]urisdiction exists 
only over the debtor and his property, and no further" 11s with the fact 
that Congress extended the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts to in-
clude "all civil proceedings related to cases under title 1 l."116 In fact, 
110. Of course, the court must determine in each case whether a guarantor release could 
have any effect on the reorganization. It is possible that a guarantor could be so unrelated to the 
debtor that releasing the guarantor from its obligation would have no effect on the reorganiza· 
tion; however, it is difficult to see why a debtor would bother including the provision in that case. 
111. 50 B.R. 756 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985). 
112. 50 B.R. at 758. 
113. 50 B.R. at 758. 
114. 50 B.R. at 761-62. 
115. 50 B.R. at 762. 
116. 28 u.s.c. § 1334(b) (1988). 
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the court cited no authority for its broad pronouncements about bank-
ruptcy courts' jurisdiction. If the court meant to declare Congress' 
grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts unconstitutional, it did not 
explicitly do so, although it did cast doubt on the constitutionality of 
the codebtor stay provision of Bankruptcy Code section 1301.117 The 
court's failure even to mention the statutory grants of jurisdiction to 
bankruptcy courts is inexplicable. 
The Ninth Circuit severely criticized Mackay in American Hard-
woods, calling Mackay's analysis "incomplete and unpersuasive."118 
Indeed, the plain language of the statutory grant of jurisdiction ap-
pears to leave little room for the position that the bankruptcy court's 
jurisdiction never encompasses a suit by a creditor against the debtor's 
guarantor, or an agreement to release the guarantor from liability on 
the debtor's obligation to the creditor. Such proceedings are often 
closely "related" to a case arising under title 11, 119 which is all that 
the statute requires for the proceeding to fall within the bankruptcy 
court's subject matter jurisdiction.120 
2. Power 
A determination that bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over 
guaranty agreements does not necessarily mean that they may cancel 
them. The American Hardwoods court noted that 
[s]ubject matter jurisdiction and power are separate prerequisites to the 
court's capacity to act. Subject matter jurisdiction is the court's author-
ity to entertain an action between the parties before it. Power is the 
scope and forms of relief the court may order in an action in which it has 
jurisdiction.121 
Having decided that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over guar-
anty agreements, the court nevertheless held that "the bankruptcy 
court was powerless to discharge the [guarantors'] liability."122 
The American Hardwoods court relied on section 524(e) of the 
117. Section 1301(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: 
Except as provided in subsections (b) and ( c) of this section, after the order for relief under 
this chapter, a creditor may not act ... to collect all or any part of a consumer debt of the 
debtor from any individual that is liable on such debt with the debtor, or that secured such 
debt, unless (1) such individual became liable on or secured such debt in the ordinary course 
of such individual's business; or (2) the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case 
under chapter 7 or 11 of this title. 
11 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (1988) (emphasis added). Thus, chapter 13 grants a stay to guarantors of a 
consumer's debt. The Mackay court said of this provision that "[a]lthough Congress apparently 
believed the statute to be constitutionally valid when it enacted it, ... the validity of the § 1301 
stay is not without question." The court failed to cite any authority in support of its assertion. 
50 B.R. at 764. 
118. American Hardwoods, 885 F.2d at 624. 
119. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text. 
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988). See supra text accompanying notes 97-101. 
121. 885 F.2d at 624. 
122. 885 F.2d at 626 (emphasis added). 
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Bankruptcy Code for its decision, 123 adopting the reasoning of an ear-
lier Ninth Circuit case, Underhill v. Royal. 124 Underhill involved a 
claim by an insider of the debtor that a release from personal liability 
in a confirmed reorganization plan precluded action against him for 
securities law violations. The Ninth Circuit, affirming the district 
court, found that "the bankruptcy court has no power to discharge the 
liabilities of a nondebtor pursuant to the consent of creditors as part of 
a reorganization plan."125 As in American Hardwoods, the Underhill 
court relied on section 524(e), finding that "[t]he broad language of 
§ 524( e ), limiting the scope of a discharge so that it 'does not affect the 
liability of any other entity,' encompasses [the] result [reached by the 
court]."126 
Both Underhill and American Hardwoods cite a pre-Code case, 
Union Carbide Corp. v. Newboles, 127 for the statement that "the bank-
ruptcy court has no power to discharge the liabilities of a bankrupt's 
guarantor."128 The facts of Union Carbide present the guarantor re-
lease issue in its starkest form. Mr. and Mrs. Newboles had personally 
guaranteed a corporation's debt to one of its creditors, Union Carbide. 
When the corporation defaulted on the loan, Union Carbide sued Mr. 
and Mrs. Newboles on the guaranty in federal district court. Eight 
days later, the corporation filed for bankruptcy protection. The reor-
ganization plan, approved by Union Carbide, explicitly released any 
guarantor's liability. After confirmation, the district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Union Carbide in the prepetition action 
against Mr. and Mrs. New boles for the unpaid portion of the bankrupt 
corporation's debt, despite the release in the plan.129 Relying on sec-
tion 16 of the Act,130 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's 
judgment, holding that bankruptcy courts have no power to release 
the liability of a guarantor, even if the creditor has consented to the 
release. 131 Union Carbide adopted the most extreme version of the 
"restrictive" view of guarantor releases, as it denied enforcement of a 
confirmed explicit release provision to which no party objected. 
C. The Expansive View 
Rejecting the analysis of the restrictive view cases, some courts 
123. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94 for the text of§ 524(e) and its precursor in the 
1898 Act. 
124. 769 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1985). 
125. Underhill 169 F.2d at 1432. 
126. 769 F.2d at 1432. 
127. 686 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). 
128. Union Carbide, 686 F.2d at 595. 
129. 686 F.2d at 594-95. 
130. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. 
131. 686 F.2d at 595. 
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permit a bankruptcy court to enjoin action against third parties per-
manently, at least in unusual circumstances.132 These courts rely on 
section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that "[t]he 
court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title."133 The section is 
derived from section 2a(l5) of the Act,134 which conferred upon the 
bankruptcy courts jurisdiction necessary to "[m]ake such orders, issue 
such process, and enter such judgments, in addition to those specifi-
cally provided for, as may be necessary for the enforcement of the 
provisions of this Act."13s 
Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co. )136 exemplifies 
the use of section 105(a) to discharge the liability of third parties. The 
Robins case, one of many stemming from A.H. Robins' liability due to 
the Dalkon Shield, 137 involved a challenge to a plan that prohibited 
any action against certain third parties whom the claimants believed 
were joint tortfeasors with Robins. The Fourth Circuit ruled that "the 
bankruptcy court's equitable powers support the questioned injunc-
tion." 138 It interpreted section 105(a)'s broad grant of power as "con-
fer[ ring] equitable powers upon the bankruptcy courts,"139 and went 
on to hold that "[p]ermitting a suit by [the claimants] in violation of 
the Plan is a defeat of the Plan and a resulting defeat of the other 
creditors."140 In that situation, the court felt that the bankruptcy 
court had appropriately invoked its equitable powers to prevent suit 
against the third parties. 
The Robins court also found that the injunction did not violate 
132. E.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989); Wysko Inv. Co. v. Great Am. 
Bank, 131 B.R. 146 (D. Ariz. 1991) (enjoining payment on a letter of credit); In re Myerson & 
Kuhn, 121 B.R. 145 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (enjoining postconfirmation action against members 
of bankrupt partnership); see also MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville 
Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that permanent injunction against suing third-
party insurers was within bankruptcy court's power because policies were property of the estate); 
UNARCO Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., 124 B.R. 268, 276-79 (N.D. Ill. 1990) 
(same). A closely related issue is the injunction of actions against third parties while reorganiza-
tion is pending. See, e.g., In re Otero Mills, Inc., 21 B.R. 777 (Bankr. D.N.M.), affd., 25 B.R. 
1018 (D.N.M. 1982). This Note, however, focuses solely on injunctions that remain in force 
after confirmatio~, including those that are part of a confirmed plan. 
133. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988). 
134. 11 U.S.C. § 11(15) (1976) (repealed 1978). See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 316, 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6273. 
135. 11 U.S.C. § 11(15) (1976) (repealed 1978). 
136. 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Menard-Sanford v. A.H. Robins Co., 493 
U.S. 959 (1989). 
137. See Robins, 880 F.2d at 696 n.1 for citations to 14 related cases that resulted in pub-
lished opinions by the Fourth Circuit; that footnote does not list the numerous related cases 
published by district and bankruptcy courts. 
138. 880 F.2d at 701. 
139. 880 F.2d at 701. 
140. 880 F.2d at 702. 
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section 524(e). Rejecting the rules of Underhill v. Roya/ 141 and Union 
Carbide Corp. v. Newboles, 142 the Robins court instead adopted the 
Fifth Circuit's position that " '[a]lthough section 524 has generally 
been interpreted to preclude release of guarantors by a bankruptcy 
court, the statute does not by its specific words preclude the discharge 
of a guaranty when it has been accepted and confirmed as an integral 
part of reorganization.' " 143 The court continued: "we do not think 
that section [524(e)] must be literally applied in every case as a prohi-
bition on the power of the bankruptcy courts.''144 
D. The Middle Course 
Two courts have attempted to steer a course between the restric-
tive and the expansive approaches to section 524(e). In In re AOV 
Industries, 145 a creditor objected to the provision of the plan dealing 
with payment for its class. The provision was unusual in that the 
funds were to come from two sources: the debtor would contribute 
$800,000 to be divided equally among all allowed claims in the class, 
and two creditors outside the class would contribute almost $3 million 
to be divided equally among those class members who agreed to re-
lease the contributing creditors from any claims arising out of transac-
tions with the debtor.146 Two of the creditors in the class objected to 
the payment plan, claiming that it "invalidly grants a 'discharge' to 
those entities [offering to fund the plan]."147 The court disagreed, 
pointing out that the plan did not discharge the contributing creditors, 
but rather "provide[d] that any creditor may individually and volunta-
rily release [the contributing creditors] of any alleged liability in return 
for the extremely valuable consideration tendered by [the contributing 
creditors]. [The complaining creditors were] completely free to pursue 
any rights they may have against these entities,"148 as long as they did 
not share in the funds offered by the contributing creditors. 149 
141. 769 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1985); see supra text accompanying notes 124-26. 
142. 686 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1982); see supra text accompanying notes 127-31. 
143. 880 F.2d at 702 (quoting Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046, 1050 (5th Cir. 
1987)). 
144. 880 F.2d at 702. 
145. 31 B.R. 1005 (D.D.C. 1983), modified on other grounds, 792 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 
1986). 
146. AOV, 31 B.R. at 1008-09. 
147. 31 B.R. at 1010. 
148. 31 B.R. at 1010. 
149. The AOV court - a district court - had more trouble with the bankruptcy court's 
declaration that any releases tendered under the payment provision were " 'fully enforceable in 
accordance with their terms, any provision of applicable nonbankruptcy law to the contrary 
notwithstanding.' " 31 B.R. at 1010 (quoting the bankruptcy court's unpublished order of confir-
mation). The court stated that the declaration was "probably beyond [the bankruptcy court]'s 
power.'' 31 B.R. at 1010. However, the court then found that as an Article III court, it did have 
power to enforce the releases, and held that "[t]his Court would enforce those releases because it 
believes that the plan is in the 'best interests of the creditors.'" 31 B.R. at 1010-11. 
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The debtor in In re Monroe Well Service, Inc. 150 modeled its plan 
after the one in AO V, also allowing voluntary release of certain parties 
in exchange for the right to share in funds provided by the released 
parties.151 The Monroe court agreed with the reasoning inAOV, and 
found the plan unobjectionable as written.152 The court cited Un-
derhill v. Royal for the proposition that a debtor "could not obtain 
confirmation of a plan which would attempt, over [the creditors'] ob-
jection, to discharge the obligations of nondebtors, such as guaran-
tors." 153 It concluded, however, that in the case before it the release of 
the third parties was "purely voluntary" and hence "the nondebtor 
plan funders will not receive a discharge and the debtor's discharge 
did not, by itself, affect the rights of creditors vis-a-vis those plan 
funders." 154 Because no "discharge" was granted to third parties, the 
court found that the plan complied with section 524(e).155 
A split in authority exists, therefore, as to the proper interpretation 
of section 524(e). The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have held that sec-
tion 524(e) does not necessarily deprive bankruptcy courts of power to 
release a third party from liability in all circumstances, while the Sev-
enth and Ninth Circuits, along with many lower courts, 156 have held 
that it does. 157 The AOV and Monroe courts have tried to split the 
difference by construing the term "discharge" to exclude releases given 
to third parties in exchange for additional payment. Rather than at-
tempt to resolve the split, however, Part III of this Note will use the 
insights of each approach in analyzing the power of bankruptcy courts 
to extinguish subordination agreements over the objection of their out-
voted beneficiaries. 
150. 80 B.R. 324 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). 
151. 80 B.R. at 329. 
152. 80 B.R. at 334. 
153. 80 B.R. at 334. 
154. 80 B.R. at 334. 
155. 80 B.R. at 334-35. 
156. See cases cited supra note 95. 
157. In American Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re American Hardwoods, 
Inc.), 885 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit attempted to reconcile Robins with the 
Ninth Circuit line of cases. It stated that "[e]ven if we adopted [Robins]. it would not dictate a 
different result," noting that Robins "expressly limited its holding to the unusual facts before it." 
885 F.2d at 626. However, while Robins found the bankruptcy court's injunction appropriate in 
light of the highly unusual facts of the case, see infra text accompanying notes 223-27, the court's 
reading of§ 524(e) was not limited to the specific facts of the case and is inconsistent with the 
Ninth Circuit approach. Of course, if it wanted to avoid the conflict, the Ninth Circuit could 
have held that§ 524(e) does not invariably forbid release of third parties, yet still have held that 
on the facts of American Hardwoods a third-party release would have been an inappropriate use 
of the bankruptcy court's equitable powers. Some courts have adopted this approach. See Dore 
& Assocs. Contracting, Inc. v. American Druggists' Ins. Co. (In re Dore & Assocs. Contracting, 
Inc.), 54 B.R. 353, 357, 361 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985); In re Brentano's Inc., 36 B.R. 90, 92 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). However, the American Hardwoods court instead stuck with the previous 
Ninth Circuit approach that third-party release is "specifically proscribed by 11 U.S.C. 
§ 524(e)." 885 F.2d at 625. 
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III. SUBORDINATION AGREEMENTS UNDER CHAPTER 11 
This Part attempts to resolve the puzzle posed by Frugal Finan-
cial's efforts to protect its rights under a subordination agreement in 
chapter 11 proceedings.158 Section III.A examines confirmation by 
consent of all classes, concluding that if an outvoted senior creditor 
objects to a violation of its subordination agreement, the court should 
find that the plan violates section 510(a) and thus that it cannot con-
firm the plan. Section III.B considers the cramdown situation, and 
finds that due to a statutory peculiarity, a dissenting senior creditor in 
a class voting to accept the plan will be without the arguments avail-
able in a confirmation by consent, but that if the entire class of senior 
creditors dissents, the absolute priority rule will generally require en-
forcement of subordination agreements. This Part concludes that 
bankruptcy courts should permit senior creditors to insist on the en-
forcement of subordination agreements whenever either section 510(a) 
or the absolute priority rule is applicable to the case. 
A. Plans Confirmed by Consent 
To be confirmed, a plan must "compl[y] with the applicable provi-
sions of [the Code]."159 Section 510(a) governs subordination agree-
ments, 160 so when creditors involved in a chapter 11 case have entered 
into subordination agreements, section 510(a) applies161 and a plan 
must comply with it to be confirmed. The central issue, therefore, is 
what compliance with section 510(a) entails. 
If every senior creditor approves a plan containing a provision 
making payments to subordinated creditors and expressly providing 
that they need not tum those payments over to the senior creditors, 
section 510(a) poses no obstacle to confirmation. Because nonban-
kruptcy law162 would not require a creditor to enforce a subordination 
agreement if it chose not to, a senior creditor's vote for a plan extin-
guishing the creditor's subordination agreement creates no conflict 
158. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23. 
159. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(l) (1988). 
160. See supra section I.C. 
161. Section 103(a) of the Code provides that "[e]xcept as provided in section 1161 of this 
title [which deals with railroads], chapters 1, 3, and 5 of this title apply in a case under chapter 7, 
11, 12, or 13 of this title." 11U.S.C.§103(a) (1988). Section 510(a) is part of chapter 5 of the 
Code, so it "applies" to any chapter 11 case where it is relevant. See, e.g., In re The Lantana 
Motel, 124 B.R. 252, 255 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Union Natl. Bank of 
Pittsburgh (In re Pittsburgh Cut Flower Co.), 118 B.R. 31, 34-35 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990); Ci-
tibank, N.A. v. Smith Jones, Inc., 17 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982). 
162. Section 510(a) requires enforcement of subordination agreements "to the same extent 
that such agreement is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law," 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) 
(1988), and "nonbankruptcy law" in this context means contract law. See Sepco, Inc. v. Valley 
State Bank (In re Sepco, Inc.), 36 B.R. 279, 285 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1984); supra section J.B. 
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with section SlO(a).163 When senior creditors unanimously vote to ap-
prove a plan, it does not deprive any creditor of a right it wishes to 
retain. 
If some individual senior creditors vote against the plan but all 
classes still approve it, 164 the problem becomes more complicated. 
Frugal Financial is in this situation.165 Frugal insists that, notwith-
standing the contrary vote of its class and the usual rule that individ-
ual class members are bound by the will of the class, 166 the bankruptcy 
court should not confirm the plan because it violates section 510(a). 
Frugal's first argument might be that the language of section 
510(a) is clear and unambiguous, rendering further analysis unneces-
sary.167 The statute says that a subordination agreement "is enforcea-
ble," and that, Frugal could argue, is precisely what it means. "Under 
11 U.S.C. § 510(a), full effect must be given to pre-bankruptcy subor-
dination agreements."168 But because statutory construction is a "ho-
listic endeavor,"169 a court might balk at reading section 510(a) in a 
vacuum despite the apparent strength of its plain language. Rather, it 
might "consider § 510(a) together with other sections of the Bank-
ruptcy Code and the principles and policies of bankruptcy law."170 
Particularly because the meaning of the legislative history regarding 
this issue is unclear, 171 a court might demand more than a plain-lan-
guage argument. 
A court assessing Frugal's position will find little case law for gui-
dance. No reported case under the Code has faced the argument 
posed by Frugal.172 Under the Act, one case faced, but did not defini-
163. This much is made clear by the legislative history to § 510(a). See supra notes 67-69 
and accompanying text. 
164. Recall that under § l 126(c), only the holders of two thirds in amount and one half in 
number of claims in a class must vote in favor of the plan for the class as a whole to accept it. 
See supra note 81. 
165. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. 
166. See supra note 19. 
167. See In re Public Serv. Co., 108 B.R. 854, 874-80 (Banlcr. D.N.H. 1989); 2A NORMAN J. 
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (4th ed. 1984) (describing the 
"plain meaning" rule). 
168. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 134 B.R. 528, 532 (Banlcr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also 2 
CoLLIER, supra note 69, 1[510.05, at 510-14 (noting that statutory language does not support 
excluding nonconsenting senior creditors from its scope). 
169. United Sav. Assn. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (con-
struing §§ 361 and 362 of the Banlcruptcy Code), quoted in International Primate Protection 
League v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 111 S. Ct. 1700, 1705 (1991). 
170. In re Holly's, Inc., 140 B.R. 643, 676 (Banlcr. W.D. Mich. 1992). 
171. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. 
172. Commentators have observed that such an argument might be available. See supra note 
73. 
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tively resolve, a similar situation.173 In Bartle v. Markson Bros., 174 the 
bankruptcy court confirmed a plan that proposed payment of 47.5% 
of the general unsecured claims, and 15% in cash and 85% in notes of 
the subordinated claims. Enough general creditors voted for the plan 
to constitute approval of their class, but the dissenting general credi-
tors appealed. They argued that paying the subordinated debt in full 
while paying only 47.5% of the senior debt violated the best-interests 
test. 175 The court noted that "[tjhis part of the plan strikes us as in-
deed doubtful."176 However, because the plan provided more than liq-
uidation would have, 177 and because "the creditors were advised of the 
subordinate status of the debentures before a majority of them gave 
their acceptances,"178 the court asserted that the payment provisions 
did not necessarily make confirmation erroneous. The court then re-
versed the confirmation order on other grounds.179 
One commentator has characterized Bartle as "arguably authority 
for the power of the bankruptcy court to bind nonconsenting senior 
creditors to a plan which extinguishes their contractual rights."180 
However, there are reasons to view the case otherwise, particularly 
under the Code. First, the Act contained no provision requiring 
courts to enforce subordination agreements. Although courts were 
generally unsympathetic to subordinated creditors' attempts to get 
around the agreements against the senior creditors' will, 181 there was 
nothing in the Act or in the case law to prevent a class of senior credi-
tors from voluntarily extinguishing the rights of the entire class, de-
spite the protests of the dissenters, if the plan satisfied the best-
interests test. The Bartle court reasoned that because the plan satisfied 
the best-interests test and because the majority of creditors approved 
the plan knowing that the subordinated debt would receive full pay-
ment, confirmation was not "necessarily erroneous in law."182 Under 
the Code, however, the best-interests test is no longer the only statu-
173. Other reported cases involving plans that make partial payments to both senior and 
subordinated creditors, see cases cited supra note 18, have not presented the problem of an out-
voted senior creditor appealing confirmation. 
174. 314 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1963). 
175. Because no provision of the Act dealt with subordination agreements, the dissenting 
creditors' only possible statutory basis for reversal was a violation of the best-interests test, codi-
fied in the Act at 11 U.S.C. § 766(2) (1976) (repealed 1978), which requires that no creditor 
receive less in a reorganization than it would in a liquidation. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 
412, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5963, 6368; see supra text accompanying notes 85-87. 
176. Bartle, 314 F.2d at 305. 
177. The plan therefore satisfied the best-interests test codified at 11 U.S.C. § 766(2) (1976) 
(repealed 1978). 
178. 314 F.2d at 305. 
179. 314 F.2d at 305-06. 
180. Lopes, supra note 14, at 226. 
181. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text. 
182. 314 F.2d at 305. 
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tory hurdle to clear with regard to subordination agreements. "Since 
the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code and section 510(a), enforce-
ment of subordination provisions is no longer solely an application of 
the court's equitable powers. It is mandated by statute."183 Thus, 
under the Code, a court could find the plan in Bartle inconsistent with 
section 510(a) and refuse to confirm it on that basis. 
Second, after faint-heartedly approving the payment provisions of 
the plan, the court in Bartle reversed the confirmation order because 
of a violation of section 14( c )(7) of the Act.184 Because the court had 
found "indeed doubtful" a plan that paid subordinated creditors in full 
before senior creditors, 185 the court might still have denied confirma-
tion on equitable grounds because of these "indeed doubtful" payment 
provisions if a statutory basis for denying confirmation had not been 
available. The court's characterization of confirming the payment 
provision as not "necessarily erroneous in law" 186 bolsters this reading 
of Bartle. The court's use of the phrase "in law" may indicate that it 
intended to stick to legal, as opposed to equitable, grounds for denying 
confirmation if it could, but that the provision might have been suffi-
ciently inequitable to justify denial of confirmation in equity. Because 
the court could use section 14( c )(7) to deny confirmation on statutory 
grounds, it did not need to look to equity. Finally, on any reading of 
Bartle, the court's approval of the payment to subordinated creditors 
is dictum because of the eventual denial of confirmation. The case 
thus provides uncertain authority concerning the question of bank-
ruptcy courts' power to modify subordination agreements. 
Faced with sparse and ambiguous case law, Frugal might next 
make a policy argument to convince the court that its reading of sec-
tion 510(a) is correct. Two important policies are relevant: first, al-
lowing creditors the benefit of their bargain and their foresight by 
upholding their contingency plans in bankruptcy;187 and, second, al-
lowing a class to speak for all its members and thus to override the 
dissenters' wishes.188 
The importance of the first policy in the subordinated debt context 
is indisputable. Twenty-six years ago the Second Circuit observed that 
183. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 134 B.R. 528, 533 (Banlcr. S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
184. 314 F.2d at 306. Section 14(c)(7) of the Act denied discharge if the debtor "failed to 
explain satisfactorily any losses of assets." 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(7) (1976) (repealed 1978). The 
court found that the debtor had failed to explain the loss of nearly $2 million. 
185. 314 F.2d at 305. 
186. 314 F.2d at 305 (emphasis added). 
187. One obvious implementation of this policy in the Code is the rule that a secured creditor 
may foreclose on its security interest during a banlcruptcy case if the debtor does not provide 
adequate protection for the security interest. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(d)(l) (1988); WHITE & 
NIMMER, supra note 76, at 153. Another is that a debtor's discharge does not affect the liability 
of codebtors on the debt. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (1988); infra notes 206-10 and accompanying 
text. 
188. See 11 U.S.C. § 114l(a) (1988); supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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failing to enforce subordination agreements in bankruptcy "would not 
only place in jeopardy literally billions of dollars of outstanding loans, 
but in all probability would prompt lending institutions to reconsider, 
and possibly curtail, their subordinated debt-financing activities to the 
detriment of the entire business community."189 With the explosive 
growth of subordinated debt in recent years, 190 the court's characteri-
zation of the importance of enforcing subordination agreements is 
more compelling than ever. Recently, a court has noted that permit-
ting a debtor to make partial payment to subordinated creditors in the 
face of a default on the senior debt "would prevent senior unsecured 
noteholders from ever feeling safe in their investment."191 A bank-
ruptcy system that would jeopardize enforcement of subordination 
agreements at precisely the instant that senior creditors need them 
most192 would undermine the entire institution of subordinated debt 
and could severely restrict the willingness of lenders to make funds 
available to borrowers with heavy debt loads.193 
On the other hand, overriding the wishes of an outvoted class 
member in bankruptcy is critical to the proper functioning of chapter 
11. Unless cramdown is invoked, confirmation requires the unani-
mous assent of all impaired classes,194 but defines a class of claims' 
acceptance as a simple majority in number and a two-thirds majority 
in amount.195 Because all of the claims in a class must be "substan-
tially similar,"196 the Code's acceptance structure attempts to ensure 
that, for every type of claim, most of the holders find the plan accepta-
ble. Apparently anticipating some difficulty in obtaining unanimity 
among creditors, Congress decided to permit a class to accept a plan, 
notwithstanding the negative votes of some members, if sufficient 
189. In re Credit Indus. Corp., 366 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1966) (footnote omitted). 
190. See, e.g., Adair, supra note 3, at 38; McGuinness & Goldman, supra note 18, at 20; 
supra text accompanying notes 2-3. 
191. Fleet Natl. Bank v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 510, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(footnotes omitted). 
192. Without the risk of insolvency, there would be no need for subordination agreements at 
all. Every creditor would be assured full payment. See In re Aktiebolaget Kreuger & Toll, 96 
F.2d 768, 770 (2d Cir. 1938) ("Subordination ••• would be meaningless in a solvent corpora-
tion ..•. "); Daniel C. Cohn, Subordinated Claims: Their Classification and Voting Under Chap-
ter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293, 296 (1982) ("A subordination 
agreement would be nearly useless if not enforceable in a bankruptcy case."). 
193. One could argue that this result might actually be a good thing. Perhaps it could have 
avoided the overleveraging of the 1980s that was partially responsible for a long and painful 
recession in the 1990s. However, to allow parties to enter into subordination agreements, to 
write into the Bankruptcy Code a section that appears to protect them, and only at the late date 
of plan confirmation to inform the senior creditor that it should not have relied on the agreement, 
seems to be the least fair and most destabilizing way of avoiding excessive leveraging. Far better 
would be to outlaw subordinated debt all together, or at least make clear that subordination 
agreements are at risk in bankruptcy. 
194. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (1988). 
195. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1988). 
196. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1988). 
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agreement existed within the class to satisfy section 1126(c).197 The 
rationale behind this decision is straightforward: because section 
l 122(a) requires that all claims in a class be "substantially similar," 
one may reasonably assume that if most of the creditors in the class 
accept the plan, the plan treats the class fairly. Moreover, always re-
quiring unanimity within a class could permit a "rogue" creditor to 
sabotage confirmation to the detriment of all concerned, perhaps for 
its own selfish ulterior motives. 19B 
Frugal must now convince the court that, in the case of 
subordinated debt, the first policy should override the second. To do 
so, Frugal might bolster its plain-language argument by analogizing its 
position to that of a creditor objecting to the release of a guarantor. 
Drawing on the cases holding that section 524(e)199 prohibits the court 
from confirming a plan that releases a guaranty agreement, 200 Frugal 
might argue the "restrictive approach": that subordination agree-
ments, like guaranty agreements, are beyond the reach of the bank-
ruptcy court, and a reorganization plan may not affect them. 
The first response to Frugal's argument might be that section 
524(e) should not even apply to subordinated creditors.201 Section 
524(e) provides that the debtor's discharge does not affect the "liability 
of any other entity"202 on a debt of the debtor. Its legislative history is 
one sentence: "Subsection [(e)] provides the discharge of the debtor 
does not affect co-debtors or guarantors."203 A subordinated creditor 
is not a guarantor or codebtor in the usual sense because the 
subordinated creditor is not automatically liable to the extent that the 
debtor fails to pay, while a guarantor would be.204 On the other hand, 
as one commentator has stated, "[t]he essence of the subordination 
agreement is a guaranty or indemnification, limited by the amount 
payable to or received by the subordinated creditor in a bankruptcy 
proceeding."205 To decide whether a subordinated creditor is an "en-
197. But Congress apparently did not wish to allow confirmation over the objection of most 
holders of any particular type of claim without the additional protection afforded claimants 
under the cramdown provisions of § 1129(b). The absolute priority rule, applicable only in 
cramdown, is designed to protect dissenting classes from unfair treatment. See supra text accom-
panying notes 88-91. 
198. For example, a creditor might have an interest in seeing the debtor's reorganization fail 
in order to improve the position of a competitor of the debtor in whom the creditor has some 
financial interest. 
199. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text for the text of§ 524(e) and its precursor 
in the Act. 
200. See supra section 11.B. 
201. See Lopes, supra note 14, at 226-27; McGuinness & Goldman, supra note 18, at 23. 
202. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (1988). 
203. SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 81, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5867. 
204. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
205. Lopes, supra note 14, at 227; see also In re Holly's, Inc., 140 B.R. 643, 674-75 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mich. 1992) (holding that an affirmative promise clause whose "practical effect" was that 
of a guaranty constituted a subordination agreement); Carlson, supra note 35, at 996 (describing 
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tity" with "liability" to a senior creditor within the meaning of section 
524(e), one must examine the underlying purpose of the section. 
United States v. Stribling Flying Service 206 illustrates section 
524(e)'s usual function. In Stribling, the guarantors of a debt which 
had been reduced in chapter 11 proceedings argued that they should 
no longer be liable on the full amount of the debt. They claimed that 
their obligation to guarantee was coextensive with the debtor's obliga-
tion to pay, so a reduction in the debtor's obligation should reduce 
that of the guarantors dollar for dollar.207 The plan apparently made 
no mention of reducing the guarantors' obligation. The court rejected 
the guarantors' argument as inconsistent with section 524(e).208 
Where the guarantors' only argument rested on the effect of the 
debtor's discharge somehow carrying over to the guarantors' obliga-
tion, as in Stribling, one cannot quarrel with the court's conclusion.209 
A creditor requires a guarantor presumably because it wants to be as-
sured of payment and is unsure of the debtor's ability to handle the 
debt.210 To hold that the debtor's failure to be able to pay the debt-
the very event for which the creditor was planning - automatically 
deprives the creditor of the right to collect from the guarantor makes 
little sense. Section 524(e) stands for the proposition that when the 
debtor has confessed an inability to pay by filing for bankruptcy pro-
tection, the guarantor becomes liable on the entire unpaid debt. The 
debtor's discharge should not preclude the creditor from pursuing 
other ways of satisfying the debt if it had the foresight to arrange 
them. 
Similar reasoning applies to debt subordination. Senior lenders, 
when lending to an entity already carrying a heavy debt load, often 
rely on the fact that they are first in line for payment, much as a credi-
tor relies on a guarantor when making a risky loan.211 The policy of 
a subordinated creditor as a "nonrecourse guarantor''); McGuinness & Goldman, supra note 18, 
at 20 ("[A] subordinated lender can be characterized as a limited surety for the debtor."), 
206. 734 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1984). 
207. 734 F.2d at 222-23. 
208. 734 F.2d at 223; see also In re Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp., 881 F.2d 1346, 1350-51 (5th 
Cir. 1989) (rejecting a guarantor's argument like the one put forth in Stribling). 
209. See also R.I.D.C. Indus. Dev. Fund v. Snyder, 539 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1976) (pre-Code 
case). 
210. See, e.g., JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT s. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
§ 13-13, at 576 (3d ed. 1988); WHITE & NIMMER, supra note 76, at 144 ("[T]he whole idea of the 
guarantee is that the guarantor will be liable in the case of • • . failure of the underlying 
debtor ••.. "). 
211. "It is also entirely reasonable to expect that senior noteholders would presume that their 
rights would never be diminished by debenture-holders junior to them." Fleet Natl. Bank v. 
Trans World Airlines, 767 F. Supp. 510, 518 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also McGuiness & 
Goldman, supra note 18, at 20. Enforcing subordination agreements in bankruptcy does not, 
however, require a showing of reliance by the senior creditor. See In re Credit Indus. Corp., 366 
F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1966); In re General Homes Corp., FGMC, 134 B.R. 853, 864 (Bankr. 
S.D. Tex. 1991). 
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not depriving lenders of their insurance212 when the debtor receives a 
discharge extends to subordinated creditors as well as guarantors. 
Once a subordinated creditor receives any payment from the debtor 
while the subordination provision is in effect,213 the subordinated cred-
itor's contractual turnover obligation guarantees payment on the se-
nior debt in precisely the amount of payment received, and in that 
limited sense a subordinated creditor has "liability" to the senior cred-
itor on the debt.2 14 A subordinated creditor therefore appears to fall 
within the broad language of section 524(e), which applies to any en-
tity other than the debtor that has liability on the debt. 
However, applying the restrictive view of section 524(e) to subordi-
nation agreements leads to peculiar results. Courts applying the re-
strictive approach to guarantor releases hold that a plan containing 
such a release may not be confirmed even if every creditor votes for 
it,215 and if the plan is confirmed the guarantor is subject to postcon-
firmation collateral attack.216 One possible justification for disallow-
ing even voluntary release of guarantors is that the guarantor may be 
neither a creditor nor a debtor, and therefore should neither benefit 
nor suffer from proceedings to which it is not a party.217 That justifi-
cation does not apply to subordination agreements, where by defini-
tion the senior and subordinated creditors are both owed money by the 
common debtor, and therefore are both parties to the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. 218 In light of this fact and the general policy of chapter 11 
that debtors and creditors should be able to negotiate the agreement 
that suits them best,219 the argument that a creditor cannot voluntarily 
212. The term insurance is used here only in the broad sense that in the event of the debtor's 
default, the senior lender looks to another party to bear the loss. 
213. This will be the case either when the agreement is a complete subordination that re-
quires no default to be effective, or when the specified default event has occurred. See supra notes 
32-37 and accompanying text. 
214. "Liability" means "every kind of legal obligation, responsibility, or duty." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 914 (6th ed. 1990). Because a subordinated creditor's failure to turn over 
payments received in violation of a subordination agreement would constitute an actionable 
breach of contract, subordinated creditors have a legal obligation to comply with the terms of 
subordination agreements, i.e., they have liability for failing to comply. Lopes, supra note 14, 
states that § 524(e) "arguably" applies to subordinated creditors, that guarantor release cases 
"seem analogous," and that "[i]t would seem" that a subordinated creditor is "at least in some 
manner a surety." Id. at 226-27. 
215. See, e.g., Union Carbide v. Newboles, 686 F.2d 593, 595 (7th Cir. 1982). 
216. See supra section 11.B.2. But see Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 
1987), for the view that even assuming that the bankruptcy court did not properly confirm a plan 
releasing a guarantor, the confirmed plan is entitled to res judicata effect and precludes a creditor 
who failed to appeal the plan's confirmation from bringing a collateral attack against the 
guarantor. 
217. See In re A.J. Mackay Co., 50 B.R. 756 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985). 
218. See supra text accompanying notes 27-31. 
219. See AARON, supra note 17, § 12.01, at 12-2 (describing chapter 11 as "a framework for 
negotiation"). 
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give up its rights under a subordination agreement is untenable.220 
Although a court would likely find Frugal's argument to apply the 
restrictive view of guarantor releases to subordination agreements un-
persuasive, even the expansive view supports Frugal's position. Sec-
tion 524(e), whatever its precise meaning, indicates that bankruptcy 
courts should generally avoid interfering with creditors' right to look 
to parties other than the debtor for satisfaction of their debts.221 
Many courts facing the issue have adopted the restrictive view of guar-
antor releases;222 even the courts that take the most expansive view of 
bankruptcy courts' power to affect creditors' claims against 
nondebtors have shown some unease in doing so. In In re A.H. Robins 
Co., 223 perhaps the leading case for expansive use of bankruptcy 
courts' equitable powers to enjoin action against nondebtors,224 the 
Fourth Circuit carefully enumerated the highly unusual facts of the 
case that made its injunction appropriate: 
In this situation where the Plan was overwhelmingly approved, where 
the Plan in conjunction with insurance policies provided as a part of a 
plan of reorganization gives a second chance for even late claimants to 
recover where, nevertheless, some have chosen not to take part in the 
settlement in order to retain rights to sue certain other parties, and 
where the entire reorganization hinges on the debtor being free from in-
direct claims such as suits against parties who would have indemnity or 
contribution claims against the debtor, we do not construe § 524(e) so 
that it limits the equitable power of the bankruptcy court to enjoin the 
questioned suits. We leave questions concerning cases in which§ 524(e) 
does apply for another day.22s 
The Ninth Circuit has read that language as limiting the holding of 
Robins to its facts. 226 
Even a more expansive reading of Robins does not support bank-
ruptcy courts routinely enjoining actions against nondebtors. The 
Robins court, in construing section 524(e) to allow its injunction, held 
220. See supra text accompanying notes 162-63. The legislative history of§ SIO(a) demon-
strates that Congress approved of a class of senior creditors giving up rights under a subordina-
tion agreement in order to ease confirmation. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 3S9, reprinted in 
197B U.S.C.C.A.N. at S963, 631S; see also supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. When 
consent of such a class is unanimous, there should be no objection. 
221. Courts have denied confirmation of plans solely on the ground that the plans violated 
§ S24(e). See e.g., Seaport Automotive Warehouse v. Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc. (In re 
Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc.), 113 B.R. 610 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990); Mellon Bank v. Siegel, 96 
B.R. SOS (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 19B9). Other courts have listed a violation of§ S24(e) as one among 
several sufficient conditions for denial of confirmation. See, e.g., In re 222 Liberty Assocs., !OB 
B.R. 971, 996-97 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990); In re Elsinore Shore Assocs., 91 B.R. 23B, 2S6 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. 19BB); In re Future Energy Corp., B3 B.R. 470, 4BS-B6 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 19BB). 
222. See cases cited supra note 9S. 
223. BBO F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 19B9). 
224. See supra section 11.C. 
22S. Robins. BBQ F.2d at 702. 
226. American Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re American Hardwoods, 
Inc.), BBS F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 19B9). 
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that "[w]hatever the result might be as to the application of§ 524(e) in 
other cases, we do not think that section must be literally applied in 
every case as a prohibition on the power of the bankruptcy courts. "227 
The obvious implication is that in a case with less compelling facts, 
such a reading of section 524( e) would be appropriate. Other courts, 
assuming arguendo that bankruptcy courts may in some cases enjoin 
actions against nondebtors, have characterized such use of the equita-
ble authority contained in section 105(a)228 as "an extraordinary exer-
cise of discretion."229 All of this suggests that the case must be a 
highly unusual one to justify depriving a creditor of its bargained-for 
right to look to someone other than the debtor for satisfaction of an 
obligation. 
That general rule should be no less true for subordinated creditors 
than for guarantors. Although section 105 confers significant equita-
ble power on the bankruptcy court, those equitable powers are limited 
by the specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.230 Sections 510(a) 
and 524(e) control the reach of the bankruptcy court's equitable pow-
ers to modify rights under subordination agreements. 
The middle course approach to the release of guarantors provides 
some helpful guidance.231 That approach allows creditors voluntarily 
to release parties other than the debtor as part of the plan, but does 
not permit the bankruptcy court to release those parties without credi-
tor consent.232 The courts adopting this approach reasoned that be-
cause the releases of the nondebtors were purely voluntary and for 
valuable consideration,233 they did not constitute a "discharge" within 
the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, nor did the debtor's discharge 
by itself affect the rights of the creditors. The releases therefore com-
plied with section 524(e).234 
227. 880 F.2d at 702 (emphasis added). 
228. See supra text accompanying notes 133-35 for the text of§ 105(a) and its precursor in 
the Act. 
229. In re Brentano's Inc., 36 B.R. 90, 92 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); Dore & Assocs. Con-
tracting v. American Druggists' Ins. Co. (In re Dore & Assocs. Contracting), 54 B.R. 353, 357 
(Banlcr. W.D. Wis. 1985) (citing Brentano's). Both of those courts found that enjoining action 
against nondebtors would be inappropriate on the facts before them. Brentano's, 36 B.R. at 92; 
Dore, 54 B.R. at 361-62. 
230. "[W]hatever equitable powers remain in the banlcruptcy courts must and can only be 
exercised within the confines of the Banlcruptcy Code." Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 
485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988). 
231. See supra section 11.D. 
232. See, e.g., In re Monroe Well Serv., Inc., 80 B.R. 324, 334 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re 
AOV Indus., 31 B.R. 1005, 1010 (D.D.C. 1983), modified on other grounds, 792 F.2d 1140 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986). 
233. In both Monroe and AOV, the plans provided that in exchange for releasing certain 
parties from future claims, the releasing creditors would receive a share of funds not available to 
those creditors refusing to execute the requested release. See supra text accompanying notes 145-
55. 
234. Monroe, 80 B.R. at 334; AOV, 31 B.R. at 1010. 
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Applying the middle course approach to subordination agreements 
would preclude the bankruptcy court from confirming the plan to 
which Frugal objects. If a subordinated creditor satisfies the definition 
of "any other entity" with "liability" for a debt of the debtor,235 and 
Frugal has refused to release that liability, the bankruptcy court would 
be without power to release the subordinated creditor's turnover obli-
gation against Frugal's will. The question is whether the policies that 
justify denying confirmation of a plan that releases a guarantor against 
the will of the creditor are sufficiently applicable to subordination 
agreements to vindicate Frugal's plain language reading of section 
510(a). 
The considerable reluctance of courts to interfere with creditors' 
ability to realize the benefit of their bargain with regard to guaranties 
should carry over to their treatment of subordination agreements. The 
tremendous commercial importance of subordinated debt236 coupled 
with the express command of section 5 lO(a) should discourage judicial 
interference with subordination agreements over the beneficiary's ob-
jection. Together, sections 510(a) and 524(e) strongly suggest that the 
Bankruptcy Code contemplates leaving intact the devices senior credi-
tors use to protect themselves against the default of debtors, and per-
mitting a chapter 11 plan to extinguish a subordination agreement 
over the objection of its beneficiary undermines that very sound policy. 
Although in general a class of claimholders may override the 
wishes of the dissenters in the class,237 the Code makes exceptions to 
that rule when necessary to further a particularly important policy. 
One example is the best-interests test: a single creditor, if it can prove 
a violation of the test, can defeat confirmation.238 Another is the re-
lease of guarantors. Most courts facing the issue have held that a plan 
containing a guarantor release may not be confirmed because the pro-
vision violates section 524(e), regardless of whether the creditors ap-
prove the provision.239 Sections 510(a) and 524(e) should be read to 
carve out another exception to the rule, permitting a senior creditor to 
show a violation of section 510(a) when a plan purports to extinguish a 
subordination agreement over the senior creditor's objection.240 Such 
a showing would prevent confirmation because it would demonstrate 
235. Such a subordinated creditor falls within the purview of§ 524(e). See supra text accom-
panying notes 213-14. 
236. See supra text accompanying notes 189-93. 
237. See supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text. 
238. See Richard L. Epling, Exchange Offers, Defaults, and Insolvency: A Short Primer, 8 
BANKR. DEV. J. 15, 50 n.204 (1991); supra text accompanying notes 85-87. 
2~9. See cases cited supra notes 95, 221. 
240. This resolves the ambiguity in the legislative history noted supra text accompanying 
notes 67-69. Because of the lack of detailed discussion of§ 510(a) throughout the enactment 
process, the most likely scenario is that Congress simply did not consider this question. The 
probable meaning of the legislative history is that§ 510(a) was not meant to prevent a creditor 
from voluntarily waiving its rights to further a confirmation. 
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that the plan violates an "applicable provision" of title 11, thus failing 
the requirement of section 1129(a)(l). 
One commentator has stated the probable result of such a rule as 
follows: 
The obvious practical problem of concluding that the bankruptcy court 
has no power to bind a nonconsenting senior creditor to a provision 
which extinguishes its rights under a subordination agreement is that the 
chapter 11 debtor will find it difficult to confirm a plan. Subordinated 
creditors will not be pleased with the prospect of senior creditors bring-
ing an action to recover the dividends which they receive in the chapter 
11. Senior creditors will be reluctant to consent to a plan and extinguish 
their rights to pursue the subordinated creditor while nonconsenting se-
nior creditors are preserving those rights. Such a conclusion would 
probably mean that the only possible plan would be one which had the 
unanimous consent of all senior creditors.241 
The logic of that position is impeccable, but its prediction is less dire 
than might first appear. Assuming that all parties are working toward 
a confirmed plan, the likely result of reading section 510(a) as pro-
posed in this Note is not a breakdown of the confirmation process, but 
rather negotiation between senior and subordinated creditors to arrive 
at mutually acceptable terms. 242 Indeed, the most likely explanation 
for the fact that no reported case under the Code has dealt with this 
issue is that negotiation between senior and subordinated creditors has 
so far made litigation of this issue unnecessary.243 Furthermore, since 
the vast majority of chapter 11 cases already fail to produce a con-
firmed plan,244 protecting the integrity of such a crucial part of com-
merce as subordinated debt may outweigh the risk of endangering a 
few more confirmations. 
241. Lopes, supra note 14, at 228-29; see also McGuiness & Goldman, supra note 18, at 23. 
Lopes does not adopt either position, but merely presents the arguments for both sides. 
242. Of course, the senior creditors would be in a stronger bargaining position, since they 
would essentially be able to block the confirmation. But they deserve a stronger bargaining posi-
tion; a plan proposing payment to subordinated creditors asks senior creditors to surrender rights 
they have already bargained for, and they should receive something in return. 
243. Even if the issue presented in this Part suddenly became a burning issue in chapter 11 
cases, involving many reorganizations, the result should be the same. If the situation arose more 
often, it would mean that senior creditors were becoming more concerned about enforcing their 
subordination agreements in bankruptcy, which would simply add force to the position taken in 
this Note that undercutting the viability of subordinated debt is too high a price to pay for 
allowing a class to override its members' wishes with regard to subordination agreements. 
244. Estimates of the failure rate vary from roughly 70%, see Robert K. Rasmussen, The 
Efficiency of Chapter 11, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 319, 322 (1991), to 90%. See Edith H. Jones, Chap-
ter 11: A Death Penalty for Debtor and Creditor Interests, 77 CoRNELL L. REv. 1088, 1089 
(1992). But cf. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorgani-
zation of Large, Publicly Held Companies 78 CoRNELL L. REv. (forthcoming April 1993) (man-
uscript at 4-5, on file with author) (arguing that failure rates are misleading and that most large 
bankruptcies result in a confirmed plan). Of those few that do manage to confirm a plan, proba-
bly at least a third are simply plans providing for an orderly liquidation of the firm. Jones, supra, 
at 1089; Elizabeth Warren, "Why Have a Federal Bankruptcy System?," 77 CORNELL L. REV. 
1093, 1097 (1992). 
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Finally, in extraordinary circumstances, a court might be justified 
in invoking its equitable powers to override the wishes of a senior cred-
itor who uses a subordination agreement to block confirmation in bad 
faith. Contract law, the law governing subordination agreements, car-
ries an implied duty of good faith;245 a senior creditor that violates 
that duty would be outside its rights under the contract, permitting a 
bankruptcy court to extinguish the creditor's subordination agreement 
while not running afoul of section SlO(a).246 Absent compelling cir-
cumstances, however, when a bankruptcy court confronts a plan that 
purports to extinguish a subordination agreement over the objection of 
one or more of its beneficiaries, the court should find that the plan is 
inconsistent with section 510(a) of the Code247 and cannot be 
confirmed. 
B. Plans Confirmed by Cramdown 
The statutory picture is considerably clearer when a plan is con-
firmed by cramdown. Section 1129(b), the section governing 
cramdown, begins with the phrase: "Notwithstanding section 510(a) 
of this title."248 Therefore, in a cramdown, section 510(a) simply does 
not apply, so a plan inconsistent with section 510(a) would nonetheless 
be consistent with section 1129(a)(l).249 There are two possible 
cramdown scenarios relevant to this Note. The first is when the class 
of senior creditors accepts the plan over the dissent of some of its 
members, but some other class rejects the plan. The second is when 
the class of senior creditors rejects the plan. 
If a class of senior creditors consents to a plan which nonetheless 
has to be confirmed by cramdown because of the dissent of another 
class, section 1129(b) prevents an unhappy senior creditor in the con-
senting class from using section 510(a) to enforce its subordination 
agreement. The creditor would have to rely exclusively on section 
524(e). However, given the express command of section 1129(b)(l) to 
disregard section 510(a) in a cramdown, the argument that section 
524(e) on its own would require enforcing a subordination agreement 
should not succeed. The dissenting senior creditor loses in this situa-
245. See, e.g., u.c.c. § 1-203 (1990); REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 
(1979). 
246. Recall that § 510(a) does not enforce subordination agreements in all cases, but only to 
the extent that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" would enforce them. See supra notes 162-63 and 
accompanying text. A "rogue" creditor, like the one hypothesized supra note 198, would not be 
permitted to abuse its contract rights to jeopardize confirmation. 
247. The plan would consequently fail to satisfy§ 1129(a)(l). 
248. 11 u.s.c. § l 129(b)(l) (1988). 
249. To be confirmed by cramdown, a plan must still be consistent with all but paragraph (8) 
of§ 1129(a), which requires all classes to consent to the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(l) (1988). 
However,§ 1129(a)(l) requires the plan to comply only with "applicable" provisions of title 11, 
and on cramdown, § 510(a) is not "applicable." 
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tion. Without section 510(a) it has no statutory basis for contesting 
confirmation. 
The foregoing result seems bizarre. No policy of bankruptcy justi-
fies protecting subordination agreements held by dissenters in an as-
senting class when the plan is confirmed by consent but denying them 
protection in a cramdown. No legislative history or case law deals 
with section 1129(b)(l)'s exclusion of section 510(a) from cramdown. 
Close examination of the exclusion, however, reveals that it makes lit-
tle sense. 
Reading section 510(a) expansively, as proposed in this Note, leads 
to the position that on cramdown a dissenting member of an assenting 
class has fewer rights than it would on confirma~ion by consent. That 
position is nonsensical. Even if section 510(a) is read restrictively, 
however, the exclusion is redundant. Under that view, a dissenting 
class member is bound by the will of the class regardless of whether 
section 510(a) applies.25° Finally, if the class of senior creditors dis-
sents, the absolute priority rule will provide the same protection of 
subordination agreements that section 510(a) would.251 
The commentary of Kenneth Klee, one of the only mentions of 
this part of the cramdown statute, inadvertently points out the 
problem: 
As a general proposition a subordination agreement is enforceable in a 
reorganization case. However, the confirmation standard of [section] 
1129(b)(l) applies "[n]otwithstanding section SlO(a)." This means that 
to the extent a class of senior claims chooses not to enforce the subordi-
nation agreement, the minority in the class will be bound notwithstand-
ing section SlO(a).252 
But reading section 510(a) restrictively, Klee's statement is true 
whether or not cramdown under section 1129(b)(l) is invoked. That 
view contemplates always binding the minority to the will of the class 
with regard to subordination agreements, making the exclusion of sec-
tion 510(a) from section 1129(b)(l) superfluous. On the expansive 
reading of section 510(a) proposed in this Note, it makes no sense to 
deprive a senior creditor in a cramdown of rights it has when a plan is 
confirmed by consent. A possible solution to this conundrum would 
250. Thus, if the class accepts a plan allowing payments to subordinated creditors, the class 
has waived any rights it would have under§ 510(a) and the dissenters in the class have no right 
to contest the will of the class, so no argument that § 510(a) prevents confirmation is possible. 
251. See infra text accompanying notes 253-55. 
252. Klee, supra note 90, at 142 n.70; see also Irving D. Labovitz, Outline of "Cram Down" 
Provisions Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 86 COM. L.J. 51 (1981): 
"While the new standard of§ 1129(b) protects dissenting classes, it does not protect dissenting 
members within a consenting class, and the remaining members of that class cannot invoke Sec-
tion 510(a), otherwise requiring enforcement of subordination agreements." Id. at 52. Although 
he is not entirely clear on the point, Labovitz seems to imply that§ SlO(a) might be available to 
dissenting senior creditors involved in a confirmation by consent even though it is not available in 
a cramdown. Labovitz does not explain this peculiar result. 
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be to read the exclusion of section 510(a) as applicable only to chal-
lenges under the best-interests test, i.e., in a cramdown an objecting 
senior creditor could not count the payment it would receive because 
of the turnover obligation as part of the amount it claims it would 
receive in a liquidation. However, this reading is both a stretch of the 
statutory language and without support in the legislative history. One 
might reasonably expect a clearer statement of such a specific rule. 
Congress would be well advised to clarify the meaning of this highly 
ambiguous provision. 
If, on the other hand, the entire class of senior creditors dissents, 
the class is then entitled to invoke the absolute priority rule.253 If the 
senior creditors and the subordinated creditors are in different classes, 
the plan could not be confirmed if the subordinated creditors received 
any payments while the senior creditors were not paid in full.254 The 
absolute priority rule would essentially require enforcement of the sub-
ordination agreement. 255 
The fact that in a cramdown the absolute priority rule protects the 
rights of dissenting classes of senior creditors provides some insight 
into the proper reading of section 5 lO(a). In effect, this Note proposes 
that section 510(a) be understood as a miniature absolute priority rule, 
applicable in all chapter 11 cases, that allows senior creditors to insist 
that unless they are paid in full, the subordinated creditors receive 
nothing.256 This reading of section 510(a) would recognize that subor-
dination agreements, like security agreements257 and guaranties, are 
important devices that creditors use to protect themselves against de-
fault, and should not be undermined in bankruptcy. 
CONCLUSION 
Subordinated debt plays a crucial role in modern commerce. In 
253. See supra text accompanying notes 88-91. Of course, § 510(a) is still unavailable. 
254. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (1988); see In re General Homes Corp., FGMC, 134 B.R. 
853, 864 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991) (noting that any distribution to subordinated creditors when 
senior creditors have not been paid in full would violate absolute priority rule per se). 
255. This leaves the question of whether senior and subordinated creditors could be put in 
the same class. Most commentators believe that they could not. See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 192, 
at 315; Lopes, supra note 14, at 229 ("If senior and subordinated creditors were placed in the 
same class, the argument that all the claims in the class were not substantially similar would 
surely prevail."). But see AARON, supra note 17, § 12.03[2], at 12-19 (suggesting that senior and 
subordinated creditors could be assigned to the same class of unsecured claims). The intricacies 
of the classification question are left to other writers. 
256. This is precisely what both senior and subordinated creditors should expect from a sub-
ordination agreement when the common debtor is in bankruptcy. See supra section I.A. 
257. Commentators have spilled much ink on the question of whether subordination agree-
ments should be treated as security interests subject to article 9 of the U.C.C. See, e.g., Coogan 
et al., supra note 1. Moreover, the drafters of the U.C.C. added a section specifically to clarify 
the status of subordination agreements vis-a-vis security interests. See U.C.C. § 1-209 (1990). 
These facts suggest that in important ways, subordination agreements and security interests are 
closely related. 
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order to ensure the continued viability of subordinated debt as a fi-
nancing tool, subordination agreements must be enforced in bank-
ruptcy, even when the creditor wishing to enforce has been outvoted 
by its class. The protection conferred upon subordination agreements 
by section 510(a) of the Code should be read expansively to protect 
even dissenting senior creditors who wish to enforce rights that their 
class would waive. Any other reading can only undermine expecta-
tions and reduce senior lenders' willingness to lend. Subordinated 
creditors serve a function similar to guarantors in protecting creditors' 
investments when the debtor defaults, and the two should be treated 
similarly in bankruptcy. Much as bankruptcy courts usually disap-
prove plans purporting to release guarantors over the objection of the 
guaranteed creditors, they should refuse to confirm plans that purport 
to release subordinated creditors from their turnover obligations 
against the will of the senior creditors. This result will increase confi-
dence in subordinated financing and further the important policy goal 
of protecting the devices senior creditors use to protect themselves 
against the default of debtors. 
